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Abstract: The importance and future of smallholder farming is controversial, with 
many scholars advocating for its development in order to eradicate poverty, while 
few others see small-scale farming as an obstacle for development. Regardless of 
which theory one supports, solving the smallholders issue is not an overnight 
project rather a long process. While the future of this group, which represents over 
80 percent of the Sub-Saharan population, should be handled with great care, 
evidence shows that they are the main victims of the ongoing foreign and domestic 
large scale private investments on land. Investments on agriculture, foreign or/and 
domestic are vital for most Sub-Saharan African countries, but is the government’s 
responsibility to see that they generate desired social benefits and not increase 
vulnerability. They should not jeopardize food security but rather strengthen it.   
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1.   Introduction 
During the late 1980s and the first half of 1990s (for about five years), I was engaged together 
with a partner in an ox fattening business in rural Ethiopia, which created a temporary and 
periodical employment opportunity for over hundred smallholder farmers surrounding the 
project. Due to their limited food stock, two to three months each year before harvesting time, 
the situations of those smallholders was always critical, and were very grateful of our 
suggestion to buy their harvest in advance, which we did for several years. Our action was 
purely humanitarian and was not profit motivated, even though they were willing and eager to 
develop it into business relation. 
The controversy surrounding the current large scale investment on agriculture in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), took me back 20 years to my time and experience of rural Ethiopia. My partner 
and I were investors with ten hectares of land surrounded by smallholder farmers. But as we 
were respecting their cultural and traditional values and always consider their interest, we 
never had a problem running a profitable business and in the process developing a harmonious 
relation with the smallholders. Our presence in the area was never seen as a threat, but rather a 
solution to their seasonal problem. If it wasn’t for lack of interest on our side (due to 
engagements on other projects), it was crystal clear to me that a lot could be done on 
partnership basis with the smallholders. 
But now as land is becoming lucrative for foreign agricultural investors, many livelihoods are 
becoming insecure in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The growing interest in agricultural 
investment in SSA seems to have nothing or little to do with investment needs of small scale 
farming. This phenomenon is by many diplomatically termed as “foreign investment in land” 
or “large-scale land acquisitions”; while by critics it is referred as “land grabbing”. Those 
terms are well defined by Oxfam. “Land acquisition has been defined broadly to include not 
only the purchase of ownership rights, but also the acquisition of user rights – i.e., through 
leases or concessions, whether for a short or a long term, while land grabbing has been 
defined as “taking possession of, and/or controlling a scale of land for commercial and 
industrial agricultural production that is disproportionate in size in comparison to the average 
land holding in the region” (Kachika, 2010). According Sheppard and Mittal, “The term land 
grab refers to the purchase or lease of vast tracts of land by wealthier, 
food-insecure nations and private investors from mostly poor, developing countries in order to 
produce crops for export” (Sheppard & Mittal, 2009). Although the engagement of foreign 
nationals in agriculture in Africa is not new, the dramatic increase of the business in recent 
years is quite remarkable. The development is seen by many as a major threat to the 
livelihoods of smallholder farmers and pastoralists while some argue that it is an opportunity 
for them to benefit from the income generated from the leasing or selling of the land and other 
internal and external benefits associated with it. 
 
The importance and future of smallholder farming is controversial, with many scholars 
advocating for its development in order to eradicate poverty, while some others see small-
scale farming as an obstacle to development. Regardless of which theory one supports, 
solving the smallholders issue is not an overnight project but rather a long-term process. As 
 
 
  
5 
 
Smallholders represent around 80 percent of the agricultural sector in SSA, and any rural land 
policy in those countries needs to handle their issue with great care. All governments in SSA 
are aware of this fact which they confirmed when the Heads of States endorsed, first, the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP)1 in Maputo, 
Mozambique 2003 (Badiane, 2009), and six years later, the Continental Framework and 
Guidelines (CF&G) on land policy in Africa in Sirte, Libya 2009 (African Union & Economic 
Commission for Africa 2009).  
 
CAADP provides a clear direction for African governments to take measures to attain food 
security, achieve more equitable distribution of wealth through more equitable access to land, 
knowledge, information, technology, physical and financial resources, and to integrate farmers 
into the market economy in order to improve their access to global markets. But still, facts in 
the ground seem to show the contrary; almost none of these recommendations have been 
taken seriously by governments so far. Smallholders and pastoralists are in some way or 
another affected by the ongoing agricultural land investments in SSA. What will be the 
consequence, and what is the future like for pastoralists and smallholders, of which the 
majorities are women? 
 
Working on this subject, one has to be careful of generalizing. At this stage, I personally am 
reserved from concluding that all large scale agricultural investments in SSA as “land grabs” 
and I believe on the existence of some genuine large scale investments on agriculture with 
socio economic benefits to all parties concerned. However, after observing the recent 
development, there seems to be good reasons to be critical of the ongoing large-scale land 
acquisitions in SSA, largely due to the problems associated with its implementation. 
 
1.1. Purpose and outline 
While international land deals are emerging as a global phenomenon, this paper focuses on 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The overall objective of the study is to create international awareness on 
how the existence of smallholders is threatened by the emergence of large-scale agricultural 
land acquisition in SSA, and how the accelerating trend of commercial investment in 
agriculture affects the critical and urgent task of improving food security for the population.  
Moreover and most importantly, the paper defends the right of smallholders by indicating 
their importance for global food security.  
Much has been written in support of smallholder farming while undermining the importance 
of large-scale investments on agricultural land. On the other hand, we find a great deal of 
studies promoting large-scale farms as the only way to deal with poverty by totally ignoring 
the role of smallholders in the process. As the findings of this paper shows, most governments 
in SSA seem lining towards the second argument in favor of large-scale farms. Favoring those 
large farms wouldn’t have been a problem if it was not taking place at the expense of 
smallholders. But as we will find out further in this study, smallholders are getting destroyed 
                       
1 For more detailed content, see Appendix 1. 
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in the implementation process. While there is enough room for both to co-exist, the interests 
of the smallholders are totally ignored and are paying the price.  
The author of this study believes on their respective roles of both smallholders and large-scale 
agricultural investments in transforming the agricultural sector of SSA. By developing 
awareness of this fact, this study intends to be a bridge for future researchers to look at the 
issue in depth to enlighten governments in SSA of smallholder’s significant role on 
agricultural transformation process.   
Despite plenty of media reports and some isolated examples of forerunner research 
(particularly GRAIN, 2008), international land deals and their impacts remain still little 
understood.  While more research is done in the acquisition of large farmland, impact study 
has been given less attention. There is little information on the impacts that land deals have 
brought on the livelihood of the implemented area and country at large. Hence, investigating 
the complex reality has significant contribution to understand the rural development scenario 
and its implication to rural people of SSA.   
This study is divided into five sections. Following the introduction and the next section which 
is previous research, chapter two will focus on the situation of property rights in SSA. Chapter 
three will look at the effects of “land grabbing” in SSA on more generalized manner. 
Approaching the case study, the forth chapter provides a background on the political, social, 
and economic and food security contexts of Ethiopia. Chapter five examines in detail about 
recent land investment – where, how, and why it is taking place and the magnitude of large-
scale farmland acquisition in Ethiopia based on recent research, and will be followed by the 
conclusion. 
As primary and secondary data on land acquisitions in Africa is scarce and often of limited 
reliability, the evidence and conclusions drawn from the study need to be treated with caution. 
Nevertheless a picture is emerging of large-scale land acquisitions in Africa. 
1.2. Data and Methodology 
In the past few years, a considerable number of researches and media outlets exposed the 
mistreatment of smallholders by their governments in relation to the recent land acquisitions 
in SSA. Even though the problem started earlier, it accelerated on the aftermath of the 2007-
2008 food crises. Private investors mostly backed by their nations are trying to solve the 
problem through large-scale agricultural investments in developing countries. Even though I 
understand the importance of large-scale agricultural investments in dealing with the problem, 
I believe smallholder farmers can be part of the solution and contribute considerably to global 
food security, but they cannot do it alone. What they need is private investors and countries 
alike to co-operate with them to create the conditions to move poor rural people out of 
subsistence farming and into the marketplace. In order to achieve this, the first important step 
is to secure the smallholders land right in the areas concerned, and that is why I started this 
study by looking briefly at the historical and current property and land rights situation in SSA. 
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The study then examines the turbulence followed within the agricultural sector as a result of 
large-scale agricultural investments. To look at the current situation of few rural communities 
in each and every SSA country would have given more balanced picture on the impacts of 
“land grabbing”, but is extremely time consuming not to mention the difficulties associated in 
acquiring material. This is the main reason behind picking one Sub-Saharan country, Ethiopia, 
and two communities in two different regions in Ethiopia. Ethiopia might not be a good 
selection to represent SSA, but with its high proportion of smallholder farmers (over 80 
percent of the agricultural sector) and relatively high contribution of agriculture to the GDP 
(about 45 percent in early 2000), is still an interesting case within the region (African 
Development Bank, 2008).    
While preparing to conduct this study, I had a great expectation of material from hand full of 
government agencies and officials in Ethiopia. But as I later found out, there is an atmosphere 
of secrecy about the land deals, and government offices are very economical with information. 
From my several discussions with senior economists in Ethiopia familiar on the subject, I 
sensed that there are regulatory and procedural issues that the authorities are not willing to 
acknowledge, and that land transfers were done hastily without adequate considerations of 
long term consequences. Particularly the earlier allocations, the ones undertaken mainly by the 
regions before 2008, were not based on well-studied decisions, but rather rushed through with 
little or no safeguards and almost no obligations on the investors for sound land management. 
The air of secrecy is more likely a reaction to the barrage of criticism that has appeared in the 
international media as well as by global activist organizations, on the one hand, and the 
realization on the part of the authorities that large land transfers to foreign entities is unpopular 
among the Ethiopian public in general.  
 
Concerning detailed data on the volume of land transferred, despite my repeated effort to get 
update and detailed information on the recent land acquisitions in Ethiopia, I assume due to 
the sensitiveness of the issue, the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) was not co-operative. On 
top of that, I was advised not to use figures from the CSA of Ethiopia because of their highly 
questionable reliability. Nevertheless, information on  agricultural policies, agricultural output 
and other economic indicators were obtained from relevant government institutions such as 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MoARD), both in Ethiopia, and international agencies such as the FAO, IFAD, 
World Bank, … etc. 
 
Numerous reports and articles both in the international and local media about the global and 
local “land grab” were quite useful, and other materials of relevance to my study were 
accessed from the internet.  
 
1.3. Previous research 
The debate on large scale land acquisition is hot issue nowadays in development and aid 
organizations, politicians, academic and the community at large. The views are mixed whether 
the investment brings meaningful benefit to the local community or not. 
 
 
 
  
8 
 
Proponents of “land grabbing” argue that, the investment flow provides the desperately 
needed capital in agriculture sector in the developing world, which leads to infrastructures 
expansion, creates more jobs and skill, increases the domestic food supply, increases access to 
market and foreign exchange reserve and these contributes to “sustained” and “broad based 
development” (World Bank, 2010). But Andersson signaled the dangers associated with Large 
Scale Land Acquisition in Africa such as, natural resource degradation, loss of indigenous 
farming practices and increasing food insecurity and conflict (Andersen & Robertson, 2010). 
Other opponents opposing the recent agricultural land expansion are (Theting & Brekke, 
2010; Kachika, 2010; Grain, 2008), by saying that rather than promoting rural development, it 
neglects the local rights, exploits the natural resources of the host country and impoverishes 
farmers by not bringing about the promised benefits.  
 
Recent studies from the East and South East African countries Tanzania and Mozambique 
shows that the large scale investments on agriculture did not result in building the promised 
infrastructures, and job creation. In the case where farmers were employed the terms of the 
contracts were set to “bare minimum” (Theting & Brekke, 2010) and due to the mechanized 
operation of the farm the number of workers were much reduced (Kachika, 2010). In addition, 
the gender dimensions are ignored in the process. Since women make more than half of the 
agricultural production in Africa, short of addressing their role in the sector could jeopardize 
development (Cotula, et al., 2009).  
 
GRAIN argues that today's global land acquisition is only going to make the food crisis worse. 
Pushing agriculture toward large scale monocultures, will throw out farmers off the land in 
favor of machines (GRAIN, 2008). Spieldoch & Murphy are concerned about the over use of 
pesticide and fertilizer which can lead to water contamination (Spieldoch & Murphy, 2009). 
This has damaging effect, says GRAIN, on the biodiversity and the sustainable management 
of the natural resources (GRAIN, 2008). In support of GRAINS view, the World Bank on its 
Report of 2010 have mentioned the concerns and stated that,  
 
“Eagerness to attract investor in an environment where state capacity is weak, property right 
is ill-defined and regulatory institutions starved of resources could lead to project fail to 
provide benefits because they are socially, technically and financially are non-viable. This 
failure could result in conflict, environmental damage and resources curse that, although 
benefiting a few could leave legacy of inequality and resources degradation” (World Bank, 
2010). 
 
When writing this paper, I made a great use of many previous researches and media reports. 
But extra attention was given to some of the materials, among them,   
Kachika, 2010: Land grabbing in Africa, an Oxfam project. A kind of report which 
focused on how land grabbing is seriously threatening the livelihoods of marginalized groups 
in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, and Tanzania. Particularly by focusing on 
those land deals for food and energy security objectives, Kachika looks at the rise of land 
deals in SSA and examines the extent to which “land grabbing” is proving a risk to the 
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promotion of agriculture and its impact on mostly marginalized pastoralists, smallholders with 
extra attention given to women. 
Based on his findings, Kachika came to a conclusion that as long as African governments are 
focusing on foreign agricultural investors who have energy and food security interests, it will 
be difficult if not impossible for them to realize their objective of eradicating poverty out of 
their own population. He also reflects his concern about the fact that African regional and 
national governments are directly or indirectly behind the “land grabbing”. 
This well-done research which is entirely based on secondary data exposes clearly the 
sufferings of the marginalized groups as a result of the “land grabbing”, and in line with my 
argument, he calls for the protection of smallholder farmers. What is lacking on Kachika’s 
paper is a reasoning why smallholder farmers in SSA should be protected. I don’t think they 
should be protected for the only reason that they represent the great majority of the SSA 
population. I believe that they have a constructive role to play on food security, if they are 
seriously considered and included in the agricultural investment and development program. 
This study will try to fill the gap by providing an argument on this particular issue.  
Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard and Keeley 2009: Land grab or development opportunity? 
An outcome of collaboration between International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), this report discusses key trends and 
drivers in land acquisitions, the contractual arrangements underpinning them and the way 
these are negotiated. On top of that, the report looks at the early impacts on land access for the 
rural population in recipient countries. 
In the cases of Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali and Sudan, the report is based mainly on 
national inventories of approved and proposed land acquisitions since 2004, on literature 
reviews and qualitative interviews with key informants internationally, while in the cases of 
Mozambique and Tanzania, the study was based on qualitative case studies and on legal 
analysis of applicable law and of a small sample of land deals.  
Despite limited access to material on the subject, the report is very informative with 
impressive findings, such as:  
• Even though foreign investments are dominating the land deals, the study found that 
domestic investors are also playing a major role in land acquisitions, a phenomenon 
that has received far less international attention so far. 
• Since 2005, land based investments became more intensified, with an upward trend in 
both project numbers and allocated land areas in all quantitative study countries and 
anticipated growth in investment levels in future. 
• The private sector is dominating the land deals, though often with strong financial and 
other support from government, and significant levels of government owned 
investments. 
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The report concludes by making an important point on the perception that land is abundant in 
certain countries in SSA and suggests these claims to be treated with caution. In so many 
cases, says the report, land is already being used or claimed, yet existing land uses and claims 
go unrecognized because land users are marginalized from formal land rights and access to the 
law and institutions. 
By identifying the main actors in the “land grabbing”, this research made a significant 
contribution to the subject. Moreover, discussing the impacts of “land grabbing” on the 
marginalized groups, to my comfort the study recognizes lack of properly defined land rights 
in SSA as the core of the problem and to protect the smallholder farmers, one has to deal first 
with land rights issue. But as Kachika’s paper, this well prepared research fails to come with 
any sort of argument why smallholders should be protected. It lacks a clearly defined 
explanation on the present role of smallholder farmers in SSA and their potential contribution 
to global food security in the future. This study will touch the missing area and will try to 
provide information available in order to strengthen the smallholder farmer’s position on their 
importance.  
Rahmato 2011: Land to investors: Large-scale land transfers in Ethiopia. This study is 
based on a wide variety of source material, the most important of which include findings from 
field work in several communities affected by investor projects in Gambella and Oromia 
regions, interviews with smallholders and others in the communities concerned, interviews 
with public officials at federal, regional and district levels, documents and data from federal 
and regional public agencies. Even though his work is mainly based on primary data, Rahmato 
also made use of secondary sources, both published and unpublished, material from web 
sources, and articles from both the local and international media.  
Due to his access to firsthand information, Rahmato came out with reliable information that 
the government of Ethiopia has already transferred about 3,5 million hectares of land to 
investors and is now taking measures to transfer a similar amount in the next five years which 
will by the end of 2015 change the country’s agrarian structure significantly. His worry is that 
the shift from small-scale to large-scale farming, dominated by foreign capital with privileged 
status, will pose a serious threat to the long term sustainability of the rural economy, the 
livelihoods of smallholders and pastoralists, and to the goals of achieving food security. 
Rahmato is critical that the state has used its hegemonic authority over the land to disposes 
smallholders and their communities without consulting them and without their consent. In 
most cases, says Rahmato, “the land deals lacked transparency and accountability therefore 
they have had the effect of eroding confidence and trust among the people and their 
communities” (Rahmato, 2011). 
Another point of justification for Rahmato’s objection to the “land grabbing” is that “the 
government of one of the most food insecure countries in the world is handing over vast land 
and water resources to foreign investors to help the food security efforts of their home 
countries, or to gain profits for their companies, without making adequate safeguards that the 
investment projects will contribute the food security needs of its own people” (Rahmato, 
2011).  
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The reasons for making more use of this research than my other sources are, 
 
1. The study is mainly based on information gathered from primary sources. There are of 
course more surveys done in Ethiopia on the subject based on primary sources. But as I 
am familiar with rural Ethiopia, on evaluating the different surveys, I found Rahmato’s 
method more efficient and his sources relatively more reliable. With his team, they 
interviewed key informants, held focus group discussions, and discussions with a 
number of local officials, unscheduled discussions with towns’ people which I believe 
is very important, and collected data from regional and wereda (district) offices. 
 
2. The survey sights of his choice (Gambella Region and Bako Wereda of Oromia Region 
in Ethiopia), with their land cover consisting of several varieties of woodland, high 
forest, shrub-land, savanna grassland and permanent and seasonal wetlands, fairly 
represents rural SSA.  
 
Despite most of the impacts associated with the land transfers are well described in Rahmato’s 
study, it failed to come up with concrete suggestion how to overcome the problem. If foreign 
or domestic large scale agricultural investors are to co-exist side by side with smallholders, it 
is crucial to identify and recognize the cause of the current problem and find a solution. As I 
believe lack of properly defined property and land right to the smallholders is the main cause 
of the problem, looking at the situation in SSA on the subject might clear the way to eventual 
solution. 
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2.   Property rights in Africa 
 
2.1.   Overview 
Population growth, urban expansion, wars and conquests, technological development and 
changes in governance are among the reasons for changing land tenure systems in Africa. As a 
result, land tenure systems are diverse and constantly changing. From colonial times to the 
present, land tenure in Africa has been an object of policy intervention. The unequal patterns 
of land ownership which we find today in much of Africa are the result of statutory land laws 
imposed by colonialism, which have little to do with customary law and practice (IIED, 2006). 
Most land is not titled in Africa. For those using resources, access to land is obtained through 
diverse combinations of both customary and statutory principles, and on the basis of social 
status, kinship, government allocation, monetarised transactions, and other means. The 
constantly growing predominance of market mechanisms are the main problems for African 
poor in securing tenure.  
The Commission for Africa2 recognizes the need for land registration and titling in the belief 
that it can promote investment, reduce poverty and encourage better natural-resource 
management. But because of their expensive nature, on top of being complex and slow to 
implement, attempts at setting up conventional land registration systems have not worked 
well. If costs are to be borne by the person or group seeking formal title, this will benefit rich 
and powerful interests at the expense of the poor (Commission for Africa, 2005). Then one 
important issue is, will land titling and registration under the present circumstances in SSA 
benefit and safeguard the livelihoods of poorer groups such as the smallholders and 
pastoralists who are responsible for most agricultural production and make up the majority of 
all households? Will it support the secondary land-use rights of farmers and pastoralists? Will 
it be supporting the local systems and institutions that currently manage common property 
resources? 
The controversy surrounding land titling in SSA is observed by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) which stated on its report,  
“The pressure of population growth and increasing commercialization of land-based 
activities have increased pressure on land and raised the monetary value of land, 
undermining its social, cultural and spiritual significance. The process of and pressure for 
privatization and efficient land use have increased the individualization of tenure. Different 
forms of land sales also take place more and more. When indigenous forms of property 
undergo formalization, exclusivity of rights tends to be strengthened benefiting the primary 
right holder at the expense of others. When rights are formalized, some right-holders are 
privileged, others marginalized” (IIED, 2006). 
                       
2 The Commission for Africa, also known as the Blair Commission for Africa, was an initiative established by 
the British government to examine and provide impetus for development in Africa. Initiated in spring 2004, its 
objectives include the generation of new ideas for development and to deliver implementation of existing 
international commitments towards Africa. African leaders form a majority of the 17 commissioners. 
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The central to the agricultural economies of most SSA countries has been and still is the 
family farm which has proved to be productive and responsive to new markets and 
opportunities. However today, the poor majority are exposed for dispossession from a major 
”land grab” because a high proportion of land which they use is not registered and the 
customary land management in which they traditionally relay on is under pressure. The 
challenge now facing most SSA countries is how best to secure family land rights, in order to 
enable smallholders to address global competition more effectively. 
As is already observed by the Commission for Africa, due to their lack of local knowledge 
and financial resources, a just, large-scale national land registration system is beyond central 
governments capacity in Africa. Even though support to local institutions to undertake 
intermediate forms of land registration has been shown to be better in many places, enough 
weight is not given to the needs of those with the least power such as women, migrants, 
tenants and pastoralists. But still these locally grounded systems can provide the foundation 
for more formal registration systems, as needs and government capacities develop. 
2.2.   The Nature of Land Rights in SSA 
I found Toulmin’s description on the different nature of land rights very accurate for the 
current SSA. First settlement, conquest, long occupation or market transaction, and allocation 
by government, are the common different natures of land rights in most SSA countries. In 
some cases these rights are transferable to heirs or can be sold, in others, permission must be 
sought from the underlying rights-holder (Toulmin, 2008).  
First settlement: Rights to rural land in many areas in Africa has its origin with the first 
settlers, who cleared the land and converted it from bush to field. Commonly, these rights pass 
down through the male or female line and the current occupants claim that the land belongs to 
them because their great-great grandfather settled their and started farming. 
Conquest:  Emperor Menelik’s conquest and settlement of the present day Southern Ethiopia 
in the nineteenth century brought large tracts of land under feudal authority, to be allocated to 
loyal generals and thousands of their followers (army and army families). In the pre-colonial 
period, the great West African empires of the Hausa, Mossi and Ashanti established control 
over extensive areas of land. Similarly, the colonial conquest enabled the British to acquire 
land in Eastern and Southern Africa for settlement by white farmers. However, land claims 
based on conquest are subject to contest when political circumstances change. 
Allocation by local or national government:  Governments grant rights to land, such as for 
irrigation projects, or as grants of land to investors. In most SSA countries, large land 
holdings in government hands constitute a valuable asset for gift to political allies and foreign 
investors, and such administrative allocations are at risk of corrupt practices. In most SSA 
today, land is owned by the state and the land right of the smallholders is “weak” in many and 
“strong” in just a few countries. What I mean with “weak” land right is, when the hegemonic 
authority of the state dis-empowers the smallholder farmers and their community. Under such 
land rights, the state is the sole active agent with huge insecurity shadowing the small-holders 
over their property and the fear of losing it at any time. As a result, the small-holders and their 
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community become passive recipients of decisions from above. Regardless of the damage it 
might cause to smallholders livelihoods and the natural environment, government authorities 
can give away land to investors without consulting land holders or their communities. Thus, 
the land right “enjoyed” by small-holder farmers which represents over 80 percent of the total 
population is a “weak” land right, as they have no right of defending their surrounding 
resources except at best defend only the land under cultivation. 
On the other hand, what I consider a “strong” land right is a user right which enables 
smallholders to have effective control and use of the land they cultivate as well as the 
surrounding natural resources, which are essential for the livelihood of individuals and 
households in their community. One cannot see individual land holders and their community 
separately, because the farmland used by each holder is mostly insufficient without the right 
on common resources by custom and/or long usage. Woodland or forestland, water sources, 
pasture and grassland, sources of useful plants, transit corridors and pathways are examples of 
such resources. With “strong” land rights, smallholders have the right to defend the 
surrounding resources and are active agents in all matters concerning their lives. 
 
Long occupation and use:  Investment of effort in the land may generate the basis for a 
claim. Such rights associated with “land to the tiller”3 policies may contradict other rights, 
particularly those based on first settlement. Tensions can arise between those who claim first 
settlement rights and those claiming rights through long occupation as tenants, as in areas 
where there are substantial numbers of incoming migrant farmers, such as cash-crop areas of 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Ivory Coast. “Long occupation can never lead into ownership” say 
the Ashanti of Ghana”, and the Bambara people in Mali say that “jiri kuru be men ji la – a te 
ke bama ye” meaning “ a log may stay a long time in the water, but it never turns into a 
crocodile” (Toulmin, 2008).  
Market transaction:  In contrast to some observers claim that land is not bought and sold in 
customary African systems, in most parts of SSA, some forms of land transaction have a long 
history even though they may not involve cash payments (Lavigne Delville, 2002). A different 
kind of contracts, such as rental and sharecropping agreements, mortgage of land, temporary 
rights giving access for a season’s cropping, and sale of full ownership rights have been 
practiced in most parts of SSA. But contracts are increasingly contested, because of political 
shifts which have altered the balance of power between different groups, differing attitudes of 
new generations following the death of those originally making the contract, and rapid 
changes in land values.  
As changing values bring a transformation in the authority claimed by different structures, 
whether family heads, customary chiefs or local government, the rapid pace of change which 
we are witnessing in SSA today is bringing new risks to formerly stable systems of property 
rights. The root cause of this uncertainty in many areas is the existence of high proportion of 
land for which no written paper exists, to document the rights held, or the terms on which 
                       
3 A famous slogan in the mid-1970s during the mass movement in Ethiopia which brought down the Emperor 
and ended the thousands of years old feudal system. 
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these rights can be exercised. However, as experience in Zimbabwe in recent years has 
demonstrated, even the existence of paper title is not a sufficient condition for tenure security. 
Women’s rights are often affirmed unquestionably in constitutions, but customary law in 
which they do not have equal rights usually prevails on the ground. As a result, they rarely 
have full rights to land but must negotiate as secondary claimants through a male relative – 
father, brother, husband or son. 
2.3.   Land Management 
Governments across SSA are revising their land tenure legislation, reforming institutions for 
the administration of rights and experimenting with ways to register individual and collective 
rights to land and natural resources. The choice of structures to manage the issue of land rights 
and resolve land conflicts will have consequences for different groups of people, with some 
winning and others lose. As the report of the Commission for Africa rightly notes, Africa’s 
private sector is largely composed of family farms, and small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Consequently, if investment and growth are to be promoted, design of land administration 
must consider carefully the needs of such smallholder farmers, traders and entrepreneurs 
(Commission for Africa, 2005). 
There are various ways to register rights to land, from short-term certificates of occupancy to 
more formal registers and titling procedures. Rights can be secured at different levels, such as 
by the individual or family, or collectively by a village or clan. But the state has a fundamental 
role in managing or facilitating the process of checking and validating claims, either handling 
it centrally, or delegate it to local institutions. Given the range of diverse contexts and 
settings, there are strong arguments for developing locally appropriate initiatives and actions, 
rather than a single standard blueprint solution (Toulmin, 2008). One good example is South 
Africa, where the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) has been working with 
communities in Kwa Zulu Natal to develop legal, affordable and accessible records of 
household land rights, both to strengthen the communal system and to give households more 
security over their holdings (Hornby, 2004). 
Rights to land depend on different systems of authority for their validation. These include 
patrilineal hierarchy, traditional leadership, community councils, local government, irrigation 
authority, city council and land agency (Lund & Benjaminsen, 2001). The different forms of 
power exercised by each may depend on a combination of legal judgment, physical force, 
spiritual values and moral authority.  But the problem with such multiple structures is, the 
contradictions and insecurity which it brings regarding whose will be supported in the event 
of contest, whose rights count, and which decision-making structures are paramount. In a 
situation of rising competition for land, and with the establishment of new systems of local 
government, there is room for considerable uncertainty, negotiation and opportunistic 
behavior (Lund & Benjaminsen, 2001). 
A combination of two forms of validation, at both local and state levels is required in securing 
property rights (Toulmin, 2008). If neighbors and others in the vicinity recognize a particular 
claim as being legitimate, then rights are secured at the local level according to their 
knowledge and set of values. However, unless they also pass a second form of validation, i.e. 
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recognition by the state, these rights have no formal legal validity. In practice, if land is not 
under particular pressure, and if local systems work reasonably well, the lack of state 
recognition may not matter. But where land values are rising and there are significant outside 
interests, then clarity is needed on the status of local land rights (Toulmin, 2008). 
2.4.   The role of government 
Due to their significance to the economy, people’s livelihoods and employment, and the 
stability of the nation, governments have a legitimate role in regulating and administering land 
rights. In all nations, procedures are needed to allow land to be acquired and allocated for 
public purpose. The degree and form of intervention must be balanced against the costs 
imposed on those owning, using or seeking land. Moreover, the design of such interventions 
and procedures needs to minimize the risks of corruption. 
Governments in SSA have been reluctant to transfer full property rights to their citizens. In 
Tanzania, the president holds all rights to land “in the name of the citizens”, to be held in trust 
for them (USAID, 2010). Long-term use rights are held by rural and urban dwellers, which 
can be registered and titled, and subsequently traded. In Senegal, Mali and Burkina Faso, the 
government claims ownership of most land as state domain, and attributes use rights to 
customary occupants, as long as the land is not needed for some other purpose (Faye, 2008; 
USAID, 2010). Similarly, the government of Ethiopia claims ultimate ownership of all land, 
with long-term use rights held by citizens. These use rights can be traded, so that, for instance, 
a widow with land but very limited household labor can lease her land to a neighbor to farm 
for a specified number of years (Rahmato, 2011). 
By contrast, 80 per cent of land in Ghana is in private hands, principally through the 
trusteeship of customary chiefs, who are charged with managing these lands for the benefit of 
their peoples, with the remainder owned by the state (Kasanga & Kotey, 2001). Yet there 
remains a long-standing struggle between government and customary chiefs over how land is 
actually used, given the patronage associated with managing this asset, and the revenues 
gained from tenants. Since colonial times, power has shifted back and forth between 
government and chiefs in Ghana. After Independence in 1957, Nkrumah’s government put 
certain lands under the control of the government, as a means of bringing stubborn chiefs into 
line, and providing land for the development of cities and ports. The recent governments, by 
contrast, recognize the strength of the customary chiefs and are more inclined to accommodate 
their interests in land, since their support at election time is critical (Kasanga & Kotey, 2001). 
In South Africa, due to the very unequal pattern of land rights inherited from the former white 
apartheid regime, despite the protection of private property rights is enshrined in the 
constitution, land ownership remains a hot political issue. More than 85 per cent of farmland 
is still in the hands of white commercial farmers (Ng’ong’Ola, 2004). A process is now 
underway to transfer ownership gradually, by various means, to meet the target of placing 30 
per cent of farmland in the hands of black farmers by 2014 (Ministry for Agriculture and Land 
Affairs, 2005). 
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2.5.   Securing rights in practice 
Arguments in favor of registering title to land have been put forward for many years and they 
normally include the following perceived benefits: 
• By increasing tenure security and providing incentives to invest in the longer-term 
management and productivity of the land, land registration stimulates more efficient 
land use. David Low in the mid nineteenth century put it correctly that tenure security 
is largely dependent on the rights holder’s own perception of risk. “If a farmer cannot 
look to the future with security, little can be hazarded by him beyond the expenses 
which the returns of the year will defray; and not only will all great improvements, but 
even the most common works of the season, be imperfectly performed” (Low, 1844). 
• Land registration enables the creation of a land market, allowing land transfers from 
less to more dynamic farmers and its consolidation into larger holdings, and by doing 
so, it reduces transaction costs. In urban areas, it enables a formal market for land and 
housing that helps to increase supply and reduce prices. 
• By providing farmers with a title that can be offered as collateral to banks, land 
registration improves farmers’ access to credit, and allowing them to invest in land 
improvements. In urban areas, land registration also allows owners to use land as 
collateral for loans and safeguards their investment in housing. 
• By providing governments with information on land-holders and size of plots, land 
registration help governments to put the foundation for a property tax system.  
 
However, the evidence from research in sub-Saharan Africa shows that many of the benefits 
assumed to stem from land titling are not automatic, and, in some circumstances, titling may 
have the opposite impacts from those expected. Land titles seem to make most sense: in 
situations where major tensions exist between different groups and which cannot be handled 
by local institutions for dispute management; where customary systems have ceased to have 
legitimacy; in re-settlement areas; and where competition for land is fierce, such as high-value 
urban or peri-urban areas (IIED, 1999). 
While land registration is often proposed as a means of resolving disputes, the introduction of 
central registration systems may actually aggravate them. Elite groups may seek to assert 
claims over land which was not theirs under customary law, leaving local people to find that 
the land they thought was theirs has been registered to someone else. The high costs for 
registration, in money, time, and transport, make smallholders particularly vulnerable to this. 
Registration also penalizes holders of secondary land rights especially women and herders, as 
these rights often do not appear in the register, and are more easily dismissed. Registration 
alone may not be enough to improve access to credit. For farmers, the high transaction and 
other costs in rural areas hinder credit supply, and an unpredictable and fluctuating 
environment makes farmers risk-averse and reluctant to apply for loans. Moreover, as a 
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registering land transaction is expensive,4 transfers tend not to be recorded, with the result that 
the register becomes rapidly outdated, limiting its potentially positive effects (Atwood, 1990; 
Bruce, et al., 1994; Sellers, K. & P., 1999).  
Where farmers consider their rights under customary law are sufficiently secure, registration 
may not result in higher investments, and research shows that there are simpler means of 
assuring farmers of security. For instance, in Cameroon, even though land can be registered 
under the 1974 Land Ordinance, very few rural plots have been registered. Many farmers have 
initiated the procedure and abandoned it after the boundary demarcation phase. While 
demarcation, by itself, has no force of law, village communities saw it as increasing tenure 
security, since other villagers were unlikely to contest land rights that had received that level 
of official recognition (Sellers, K. & P., 1999). 
As a result of the recent research exposing the problems associated with land titling, 
institutions such as the World Bank, previously a vocal advocate, is now more cautious and 
recognizes that land titling may not be appropriate in many circumstances (Deininger, 2003). 
There have been several programs aimed at registering land rights in SSA, such as the Rural 
Land Plans (Plan Foncier Rural – PFR) in Benin (Goldstein, et al., 2013). But in practice, 
because of the difficulties of registering complex and overlapping rights, and time pressures 
that push staff to achieve targets at the expense of accuracy, issuing the titles has not been 
easy and is extremely slow.  
2.6.   Prospects of property right in SSA 
“Institutions are recognized as holding the key to economic development, by establishing the 
rules, norms and governance systems within which resource flows take place. Rooted as they 
are in the social, political and cultural landscape from which they grow, institutions take many 
different forms and cannot be simply transplanted from one setting to another” (North, 1990). 
Establishing an effective register of land and property rights is more likely to take many 
decades in much of Africa, given current low levels of documentation. Setting up a single 
unified system may make sense as a long-term goal, but meanwhile it may be better to 
establish locally tailored procedures that can be upgraded over time. Priority areas need to be 
identified where systematic registration can be undertaken. In areas of lower concern, reliance 
on less formal procedures is the best option, such as encouraging the use of simple contracts 
that can be validated by a village- or district-level official. 
So far, in many SSA countries, formal land titling programs have proved to be slow, 
expensive and often biased in favor of richer groups. In order to secure land and property 
rights for the poor majority, simpler methods are urgently needed, which are tailored to each 
particular local context, and as Camilla Toulmin summarized it, which includes:  
• Strengthening local institutions for rights administration and just dispute resolution; 
                       
4 In Ethiopia during the 1990s, for any transaction of property involving land, the old owner is expected to pay 4 
percent, while the new owner pays 2 percent of the total transaction value to a government authority. In such 
situation, it’s on the interest of both (old and new) owners to avoid the registration of the transaction. 
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• Identifying secondary rights and securing access for tenants, women, migrants and 
herders; 
• Using a phased approach that focuses first on priority areas such as where rapid 
commercialization threatens poorer groups’ access to land and where commons need 
conserving or protecting; 
• Introducing simple written contracts with agreed basic terms; and 
• Establishing property registers to serve as a base for property taxes that can provide 
the revenue for services (Toulmin, 2008).  
 
3.   Large scale land acquisitions in SSA.  
3.1.   Agriculture 
Relative to other regions, Sub-Saharan Africa’s rural economy remains strongly based on 
agriculture. In 2005, agriculture in SSA (excluding South Africa) employed 62% of the 
population and generated 27% of their GDP (Staatz & Dembele, 2007). The agricultural 
production systems of those countries are largely based on smallholder farms. Smallholder 
farms as mostly defined being two ha or less, represent 80% of all farms in SSA, and 
contribute up to 90% of the production in some SSA countries (Wiggins, 2009). A large 
percentage of these smallholders are women, responsible for key components of household 
production such as weeding, harvesting and processing. Further, women often independently 
grow non cereal crops for income and are increasingly heading rural households due to male 
urban migration (Oxfam, 2008). Keeping this in mind, we will look at the nature of the recent 
massive investments on land in SSA. 
 
3.2.  “Investment on land” or “Land grabs”? 
Over the past few years, governments and corporations have been acquiring large tracts of 
land in ‘less developed’ countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, intended for the 
production of crops for biofuels and food crops for re-export (World Bank, 2010). As many 
researches revealed, it was the huge price increase which ignited the sudden increase in land 
acquisition. But while commodity prices have since fallen, the demand for land has remained 
extremely high (Deininger, 2011: 218). This reflects “the speculative dimension” of 
international investment, that new markets in land and water are “a promising way to secure 
assets” (De Schutter, 2011: 252-3). These trends have generated a great deal of debate about 
the implications of such acquisitions on the host countries. Is these land investment or land 
grabbing? One recent paper put it rightly that ‘property relations’ are at the heart of the current 
rush for land in Africa (Borras & Franco, 2012). 
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Table 1:  The 13 main recipient countries listed by number of land deals and showing two estimates 
for the magnitude of all the land deals in each country. 
  Magnitude (1000 ha)
Recipient country Number of deals             Min         Max
Ethiopia 26 2892 3524
Madagascar 24 2745
Sudan 20 3171 4899
Tanzania 15 1717 11000
Mali 13 2417 2419
Mozambique 10 10305
Uganda 7 1874 1904
DR Congo 6 11048
Nigeria 6 821
Zambia 6 2245
Ghana 5 89
Malawi 5 307
Senegal 5 510
Total (27 countries) 177 51415 63111  
Source: Friis, Cecilie and Reenberg, Anette (2010). Land grab in Africa: Emerging land system drivers in a 
teleconnected world. GLP Report No. 1. GLP-IPO, Copenhagen.   
Sub-Saharan Africa is the site of the most speculative major land deals. The preference for 
Africa is closely related to the weak recognition of land rights at the country level, meaning 
that existing land-users can be displaced more easily and the price of land charged to investors 
is very low. 
As the information on land purchases and leasing is difficult to obtain, figures for the amount 
of land being alienated remain scarce and various. A report released in 2008 by the non-
governmental organization GRAIN was perhaps the first to declare a global trend in land 
grabbing linked to promotion of biofuels and food for export, while in 2009, a report by IFPRI 
stated that since 2006, 15-20 million hectare (ha) of farmland in developing countries, mostly 
in Africa, had been sold or leased to foreign entities (Borras & Franco 2012: 37). The World 
Bank in 2010 reported that 45 million hectares were under negotiation during 2009 alone, 
70% of it in Africa. Another organization, Global Land Project, estimated that in 27 African 
countries being screened, there were almost 200 land deals covering between 51 and 63 
million hectares (Palmer, 2010: 8).                                           
 
The reason for “land grabbing” being of great concern is that the land involved, on top of 
being massive, is not mostly marginal as investors and governments have argued. In most 
cases, despite the “legal” nature of many land deals with foreign investors, communities in 
rural areas are dispossessed of land that they have used for ages in order to accommodate 
domestic policy decisions which promotes foreign agricultural investments. The questionable 
nature of the contracts entered between rural communities and foreign investors as well as 
governments and foreign investors contribute to labeling many of the land deals as “land 
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grabs”.  There is a great deal of dissatisfaction in the rural community with the low quality of 
consultations, if any, done by investors, and this includes countries like Mozambique where 
consultations are required by law. Due to the fragility of their land rights, women are mostly 
sidelined in consultations and in some cases, investors have only consulted the local elite. In 
other cases, there is no compensation to the dispossessed smallholder farmers, and on those 
where compensation is provided by investors, like in Tanzania and Mali, there is a strong 
disapproval by the communities that the compensation did not match the permanent loss of 
their land. Mechanizing of operations by investors which reduced drastically the demand for 
workers, as has been seen in Ghana, failed to fulfill the promises of employment given by the 
investors. In many places in SSA where “land grabbing” took place, investors secure 
favorable deals in using available and often scarce water resources, to the detriment of 
smallholder farmers. Such cases can be seen in Tanzania, Mali, and Mozambique (Kachika, 
2010). 
As mentioned earlier, in almost all SSA countries, women have very limited access to 
resources compared to their male counterparts especially when it comes to access and 
ownership of land. Despite the higher contribution of women to agriculture than men, income 
from the land is mostly controlled by their husbands, and it’s more likely that things will 
continue in the same manner even with regard to cash from women’s labor in biofuels. While 
the question of women’s land rights is yet to be resolved in many SSA countries, the 
emergence of this new phenomenon will complicate things further and more likely delay the 
process. (Kachika, 2010). 
The common error regarding women when agricultural investments takes place is the 
assumption that men and women would benefit equally from new sources of income with no 
consideration taken on women specific traditional sources of livelihoods. Ghana can be taken 
as an example how the destruction of shea trees (used to make shear butter) by investors have 
affected women’s traditional sources of income (Kachika, 2010). Compensations do not take 
into account such women specific loses or hardships they encounter from “land grabbing” due 
to their gender roles. Policies targeting “marginal land” as are the case in SSA is found to be 
harmful to some subgroups of women. Taking Ethiopia as an example, upon the deaths of 
husbands widows commonly lose land to their in laws and are dependent on what looks like 
“marginal land” which they are nowadays deprived of this major source of livelihood by “land 
grabbing” (Kachika, 2010).  In Mali, it’s a common practice that husbands allocate the poorest 
parts of family plots to their wives which are often an easy target for land grabbing (Kachika, 
2010). As a result, no matter how fragile, they often end up being stripped of the few land 
rights that they may have enjoyed. 
Even in the case of fertile and not marginal land, women are the most affected group by “land 
grabbing”, as they are the main land users and have usually access rights. In such cases, even 
though they do not have control rights, they still lose the strongest right that they have, which 
is access to productive land. The promotion of land deals on the basis of offering jobs to 
locals did not prove to be beneficial to many women. In rural Mozambican family, like most 
of the SSA, formal employment is for men and excludes women from any employment 
prospects. Moreover, due to their relatively low level of education, even when employed, 
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women are not considered for skilled jobs by investors and as production mechanizes, women 
are the first group to lose their jobs.  
Pastoralists are another marginalized group threatened by “land grabbing”. Despite having 
considerable pastoral population, many SSA governments seem failing to recognize the strong 
contribution made by pastoralists to national economies. The millions of livestock produced 
by the pastoralist population in Ethiopia, which are estimated to be around 4 million, are a 
vital engine for farming, trade and urban activities. 10 percent of the total population in 
Tanzania and Mali are pastoralists and in Mali livestock farming contributes 30 percent to the 
primary sector GDP. 
The continental Framework and Guidelines (F&G) which was adopted by the African Union 
(AU) summit on the 3rd of July 2009 in Libya through a “Declaration on Land Issues and 
Challenges in Africa”, is a critical tool that provides possibilities for governments in Africa to 
neutralize risks related to “land grabbing” which are threatening marginalized groups of rural 
communities by reshaping the direction of foreign agricultural investments. Even though no 
SSA country seem to follow, the continental framework and guidelines did set standards for 
best practices in developing comprehensive land policies which can ensure that agricultural 
investments are promoting economic growth without weakening the development of those 
marginalized groups of the population. The need to develop comprehensive land policies for 
African countries which provides anchorage for further policy development in land related 
sectors and sub-sectors is clearly stated in the standards, and the guideline strongly suggests 
all African countries to assess their policies and laws which are related to agriculture, energy, 
and investment of their suitability for revision (F&G, 2009).  
Another important recommendation by the continental framework and guidelines is that along 
with those of the state, land policies should recognize the role of local and community land 
based administration and management institutions and structures. In most SSA countries, 
though land is owned by the State, state and customary laws related to land operate side by 
side. But despite clear laws in some countries (Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique …etc.) on the 
roles of traditional structures, the customary and statutory land administration systems in 
almost all SSA countries fail to reconcile smoothly. 
Further standard set by the guideline is that, land policies should strengthen the rights of 
women through specified mechanisms (F&G, 2009). Tanzania is a pioneer on exercising this 
standard by taking legislative steps to ensure the participation of women in local land 
administration structures like Village Councils and Village Adjudication Committees 
(Kachika, 2010), and other SSA countries have fair constitutional and/or statutory provisions 
towards promoting equality between men and women, but the parallel existence of 
discriminatory traditional systems related to land are the main obstacle in the process.  
Finally, a standard set by the guideline worth mentioning is that, policies must balance pro-
poor priorities with market orientation by mainstreaming land issues in poverty reduction 
strategies (F&G, 2009). In many SSA countries, as land can be leased out for lengthy periods 
of 50 – 99 years, in pursuing those deals, governments are required to ensure that increased 
market driven policies of land development do not expose vulnerable groups through 
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speculation and costly land rights transfer systems to further marginalization. But for instance 
Ethiopia, despite in its Poverty Reduction Strategy has positively included the needs and 
priorities of women and pastoralists, the investment laws failed to protect the interests of 
those groups. 
The importance of the issue makes one eager to examine each and every SSA country in 
detail, but that would be beyond the scope of this study. Taking Ethiopia as a case study, I 
believe, will address the problems related to “land grabbing” in most SSA countries.  
4. Ethiopia 
4.1.   A brief background 
Like other SSA countries, Ethiopia is negotiating its productive agricultural lands for long-
term leases to foreign investors. There is no doubt that there is a need for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Ethiopia. The concerns are that the land investments are not carried out in 
a manner that safeguards the environmental, social, and food needs of local populations. 
In this and the next chapter we will look at how the accelerating trend of commercial 
investment in agriculture affects the critical and urgent task of improving food security for the 
population in Ethiopia, and highlight the consequences of  “land grabbing” for local people, to 
their food security, well-being, and livelihoods. 
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development 
Index, Ethiopia is considered among the least developed (LDC), ranked 157 out of 169 
countries. Poverty is widespread in the population and around 80 percent are estimated to live 
on less than US 2 dollars per day. The life and development of millions of Ethiopian children 
is threatened by the high rates of chronic malnutrition. On average, 13 to 15 million people in 
Ethiopia face severe food insecurity each year. 
The chapter is divided into three sections, with the first section giving an overview of the 
political, social, economic, and food security contexts of Ethiopia. The second section will 
provide details on how and why land investment is taking place. The third and final section 
will focus on environmental, social, economic, and food security impacts of “land grabbing” 
in Ethiopia.  
4.2.    Social Context 
In terms of population, Ethiopia is the second largest in the whole Africa with a population of 
close to 90 million people in 2012. Like most of the SSA, the population is overwhelmingly 
rural, with 80 to 85 percent are made up of rural dwellers. Ethiopia has one of the highest 
population’s densities in the world at 66 people per square kilometer, and the great majority 
makes their living from small-scale agriculture. 
Ethiopia is characterized as a multi-ethnic country, with the main ethnic group the Oromo 
representing 34,5 percent, followed by the other main ethnic groups,  Amhara 26,9 percent, 
Somali 6,2 percent, and Tigray 6,1 percent. Dozens of local languages and dialects are used, 
 
 
  
24 
 
but Amharic is the official language and widely spoken (Central Statistical Agency (CSA) of 
Ethiopia, 2007). 
Ethiopians main access to information is through radio where most stations and the main 
television station are owned and controlled by the state. There is no access to printed media 
for the rural population. Internet users are currently estimated to be around half a million i.e. 
approximately 0,5 percent of the total population, which makes the country among the lowest 
internet users in SSA. Even those with access to internet are highly censored. Access to public 
information is largely restricted, as freedom of information laws are not enforced. Coverage of 
official events is limited only to state owned media outlets which resulted in an often strained 
relationship between private press and the government (British Broadcasting Company 
(BBC), 2011). 
4.3.     Political Context 
 
Ethiopia Political map showing the international boundary, ethnically based states and self-
governing administrations boundaries with their capitals and national capital. 
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The 9 ethnically based states, which the Ethiopian federal republic is made of, are designed to 
provide self-determination and autonomy to Ethiopia’s different ethnic groups. Following the 
military regime’s fall, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) assumed leadership and 
still dominates national politics. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF), which is made up of the different ethnic group organizations and pretends to have 
the power in the country, is seen as little more than a puppet of TPLF. Most of the ethnic 
group organizations “in power” were fabricated over night by TPLF in 1991 on their arrival to 
the capital with the intention of convincing the international community that all ethnic groups 
are represented.  
Since the 2005 elections, where election irregularities were observed by international 
observers, open dissent towards the government and its policies is not tolerated. For those 
who oppose the government, harassment, detentions, and imprisonment are common practices 
in Ethiopia today, and as a result, there is a widespread fear of culture with regard to opposing 
the government. In such environment, opposition parties are having difficulties in gaining 
ground. There are many Ethiopian groups in diaspora that advocate for change in Ethiopia and 
to build awareness internationally of Ethiopia’s policies and human rights record. 
Ethiopia is an important ally of the United States and the EU. By providing 26 percent of the 
total aid, USD 526 million on average per year (2003-2008), the US is the largest donor of 
bilateral assistance including military, followed by the World Bank 21,2 percent, EU 14,2 
percent, UK 9,3 percent, Canada, Germany, and Italy (between 3,6 and 4,8 percent each) (The 
Oakland Institute, 2011). Located in the unstable region, Ethiopia is seen as an important ally 
by these donor governments, and in the case of the US, an ally in the “global war on terror”. 
4.4    Macroeconomic Context 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Ethiopia’s economy has been growing at an average rate of 
5,6 percent annually and for the last five years, according to government statistics, scored 
double digit GDP growth. This makes Ethiopia the fastest growing economy among non-oil 
exporting countries in Africa. The economy gains are slightly modest considering the high 
rate of population growth, but still impressive. Despite this, the inequality gap is widening as 
a result of no attention being given on restructuring income distribution (Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2011). Inflation has been and still is of great concern, with rates 
peaking 64 percent in 2008.  
For the last five years even though the trend in Ethiopia shows an increasing diversified 
economy, small-scale agriculture remains playing the central role. But agriculture as a whole 
is slowly losing its share of GDP to the service sector, which is steadily increasing and for the 
first time passed the agriculture sector in 2008-2009 (45,1 percent to 43,2 percent). With 
respect to employment, agriculture remains the dominant sector by employing, according 
some estimates, 85 percent of the total labor forces (Bossio, et al., 2012).  
The increases in exports are dramatic during the last five years, and showing high level of 
diversity in product and country of destination.  In addition to the traditional Ethiopian 
exports, coffee, and hide and skins, recent exports include, oil seeds, pulses, flowers, chat, 
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gold, and leather products. The growth of export in the flower sector is very impressive, 
increasing from 0,3 million US dollars in 2001 to US dollars 150 million in 2008, which is 
about 10 percent of the total exports (Joosten, 2007). While 80 percent of horticulture 
products are destined for the EU, 50 percent of exported meat goes to Saudi Arabia, largely 
through Al-amoudi’s livestock company, Elfora Agro-Industries plc. Between 2005-2010, 
FDI from India, China, and the Middle East has increased from 14 to 24 percent of total FDI, 
while exports to these countries have grown from 23 to 33 percent (Access Capital 2010). 
Even though, the FDI has increased in recent years and investments on commercial 
agricultural land have intensified, this did not affect the export to any significant, as most of 
the commercial farms are not producing any significant output yet. 
4.5.    Food Security Context 
Ethiopia is struggling with hunger problems since the 1984-85 famine, which labeled the 
country internationally as a drought and famine prone country. While famine is not such a 
serious threat as it used to be, the country still faces problems with high levels of endemic 
food insecurity and malnutrition. As late as in 2009, close to eight million Ethiopians (around 
10 percent of the population) were considered chronically hungry (The Oakland Institute, 
2011). Currently, Ethiopia is the largest food aid recipient in the world. Since 1965, Ethiopia 
has faced 15 times severe drought and according to the Food Security Risk Index for 2010, it 
is ranked 6th out of 163 countries with regard to be at extreme risk regarding food security 
(Maplecroft, 2010). 
Climatic, demographic, political and technological factors are the main reasons behind 
chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia. Those factors include; environmental degradation and 
rapid population growth, poor off-farm employment opportunities, inappropriate government 
policies, inadequate response to current needs, conflicts particularly in pastoralist areas, lack 
of infrastructure (health, education, access to water, …etc.), gender inequality, and recurrent 
droughts and flooding  (The Oakland Institute, 2011). Most agricultural production is used for 
household needs, but even the few surpluses produced by the smallholders are constrained due 
to lack of access to markets. 
4.6.   Agriculture in Ethiopia   
The risk for annual droughts and intra-seasonal dry spells is very high in Ethiopia, due to 
highly variable and intensive rain falls. Very small proportions (around 10 percent) of the total 
cereal croplands are irrigated. The ones irrigated are those which are industrial crops, such as, 
cotton, sugarcane, and flowers, whereas export crops such as, oilseed, pulses and coffee are 
mostly rain fed. Because of drought, farm production can shrink up to by 90 percent from 
normal output. In addition to that, the extremely degraded quality of land constrains the long-
term ability of the country to withstand drought. The five commonly used agricultural 
production systems in Ethiopia are: 
1. Mixed farming system of the highland: This covers around 45 percent of the total land 
mass in areas at more than 1500 meter above sea level and practiced by about 80 
percent of the population in the sector. 
 
 
  
27 
 
2. Mixed agricultural production system of the lowland: mainly used to produce drought 
tolerant varieties of maize, wheat, sorghum and teff along with lowland pulses and 
some oil crops. This production system is practiced in low-lying areas with elevations 
of less than 1500 meters. 
3. Pastoralism: covers the Afar and Somali regions, and the Borena zone in the south of 
the country and it supports the livelihood of around 10 percent of the total population. 
4. Shifting cultivation: is a common practice in the western and southern part of the 
country. After short periods of cultivation, fields are usually left idle to re-vegetate 
(mostly 1-2 years). These areas have low population densities. 
5. Commercial agriculture: A farming system which emerged very recently. 
Even though, there is some investment in the lowland mixed agricultural production system 
areas and in some pastoralist areas, the majority of land investment currently is occurring in 
the areas where shifting cultivation is practiced.  
 
5.     “Land Grab” in Ethiopia 
The Ethiopian government and international bodies such as the World Bank (WB), have 
presented the commercialization of land and the shift to large scale agriculture as being an 
essential measure for agricultural modernization and to the improvement of production 
efficiency which will lead to increased food production and economic growth (World Bank, 
2010). According to the WB’s argument, population growth in the developing countries will 
lead to increased demand for food products, expanding urbanization, and rising incomes 
which needs to be met by bringing more land into farming and by improving productivity. 
Like many scholars worldwide, the WB’s conclusion is that Africa will benefit greatly as it 
has plentiful potential farmland and by closing the productivity gap on the ones under 
cultivation. Supporting the WB’s argument the Ethiopian government also confirms that there 
is plenty of “unused” land for investors to operate efficiently without posing a threat to the 
livelihood of smallholders. But facts on the ground show the contrary, as the rights of small-
holders to land have been clearly compromised during the implementation process.  
 
5.1.   Land and Governance 
 
The emergence of Derg5 to power in 1974 put the foundation for the land right which we find 
in Ethiopia today. The major land reform of 1975 abolished the existing systems and replaced 
them with communal (state) ownership of land. These changes were clearly stated in the 1987 
Constitution.  With specific use requirements, farmers would receive free land in their place 
of residence. In order to redistribute equally to other farmers through peasant associations, 
efforts were made from 1976-78 to confiscate land from those families with more than 10 
                       
5 The Derg (which means ”committee” in Ge’ez) was the council of army officers with communist ideology that 
governed Ethiopia from 1974-1991. 
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hectares. There was a continued collectivization of land and agriculture throughout the 1980s, 
and then in 1989, frustrated by the result of its land policy, the Derg announced its intent to 
move towards more market based approaches to land tenure. In 1991, EPRDF came to power 
and there was a fear “that opening land markets would provide inroads for dispossession of 
land from poor and vulnerable peasants” (Teklu, 2011), and the new government went back to 
the system of “universal access” and state ownership of land. The 1995 Constitution which 
reaffirmed state ownership confirmed landholders right to transfer land and assets (under 
specific conditions), and the right to compensation in case of expropriation. Furthermore, 
under the Constitution, there is increasing recognition of pastoralist rights. 
 
At present, according to regional and federal constitutions and land laws in Ethiopia, all land 
(urban and rural) is state property. Land users cannot sell, exchange or mortgage land in any 
way as their right on the land is only user’s right. Regional Authorities have the right of 
administering land which includes land allocation, registration, and disposal as well as settling 
of land disputes, but must be consistent with the federal constitution of 1995 and federal land 
laws, of which the most recent was issued in 2005. The user’s right of land holders is 
conditional on place of residence known as kebelle (sub district) in Ethiopia, personal 
engagement in agriculture as well as proper management of the land, and other restrictive 
conditions. Holders are subjected to penalties including loss of right to “their” land as a result 
of violating any of those conditions. Being absent from their farms and leaving the land idle 
for three or more consecutive years might lead the holders to lose their rights to the land. 
Moreover, if the government believes that the land is needed for “public purposes”, or that the 
land can be used more efficiently by investors, cooperative societies and other public or 
private entities, have the right to remove holders from the land. In such cases, even though the 
government has an obligation to pay a proper compensation, many land holders whose land 
has been alienated often complained that either they never been compensated or the 
compensation paid has been inadequate and unfair (Rahmato, 2011). 
 
Starting at the beginning of the 2000s, a program of land certification and registration has 
been implemented by the government.  The program was welcomed by land holders but, as 
proved later, it has not been effective in preventing public authorities from expropriating land 
and natural resources. During the same period, when the floriculture business was booming 
and land was in high demand, thousands of small holder farmers have been expropriated and 
their land leased out to private investors. This shows clearly that the current land system in 
Ethiopia is such that the smallholder farmers have a “weak” land right as they do not enjoy 
robust security of tenure and have only limited rights that are conditional and subject to 
abrogation at any time. 
 
Government land inventory (often based on satellite imagery) puts “used land” area that is, 
land under cultivation by small holder farmers, agro-pastoralists and others, at less than 20 
percent of the total area, and on this assumption concludes that there are plenty of “unused” 
land to be handed out to investors. This seems to be a misguided conclusion, as the term 
“cultivated area” does not include those lands from which small-holder farmers and agro-
pastoralists access resources vital for their livelihood (Rahmato, 2011).  
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Because of the ideology followed by the current government with a “development mission”, 
the dominant power of the state is justified as necessary. In the state’s ideology, Revolutionary 
Democracy, one find arguments used to declare the state as the legitimate and sole actor in the 
society. It draws a clear distinction between “developmental” actors who are dedicated to the 
country’s development and the progress of the people, and “rent-seeking” actors who are 
mostly guided by selfish motives and strives for personal gains like property and status. All 
opposition political parties, civil society organizations, individuals and groups in private 
enterprise in Ethiopia today are described as “rent-seeking” entities, while the EPRDF is 
portrayed as the only one with developmental credentials. To legitimize its hegemonic power, 
the government concludes that economic development is best achieved under the guiding 
hands of the state. As a result, almost all important program and policy decisions are made by 
central authorities who often are not accountable to anyone (Rahmato, 2011). This 
centralization has been strengthened over the years as the Ethiopian Parliament continues to 
be a rubber-stamp institution, civil society institutions have totally lost the little voice they 
had, and the dominant source of public information is the government-controlled media. 
The strategy of state managed agricultural development that followed from large scale 
agricultural production has brought contradictions, which impacted on land allocation, 
administration, contract management - etc. To mention few, the major one is the increase in 
institutional instability which is widely seen across the country. Since small groups at the top 
are often deciding on new initiatives, hasty changes of rules and regulations are common, and 
established procedures in policy implementation are bypassed. Moreover, consultation with 
stakeholder groups is ignored, and agencies incapable of performing the tasks involved are 
given the responsibilities. Hasty attempts at crisis management and damage limitation is 
becoming common, once the mistakes and damages start to pile up. No convincing 
explanations are given so far for the dramatic speed in which foreign and domestic investors 
were able to acquire such large tracts of land in the country, especially when most of the deals 
have little or no binding obligations and give few, if any benefit to the recipient communities. 
 
5.2.   The emergence of large-scale agricultural investments  
Around the mid-1990s, the government’s development strategy was formulated, giving the 
small-holder cultivation and crop production a leading role and was expected to serve as the 
engine of growth for the development of the country as a whole. The strategy, leaning on the 
shoulders of small-holder farmers was expected to provide not only stimulus for development 
but also a surplus for food self-sufficiency. During this period, a great deal of support was 
provided to small-holder farmers through, domestic and donor assistance, resource 
management practices and improved farming, credit services, and different kinds of human 
capacity development programs. To some extent, new technology packages were also 
provided. At this time the land system in practice was clearly biased in favor of small-holder 
farmers (Gebreselassie, 2006). The beginning of the shift from this strategy was signaled in 
the document published by the government in 2001 with modified rural development policy 
and strategies (Rahmato, 2011). Even though the critical role to be played by smallholder 
farmers was still there, the document introduced an important role for large-scale agricultural 
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enterprises and foreign investors. A couple of paragraphs are picked from the document which 
confirms the shift of policy. 
“Private investors are already making a significant contribution to agricultural development. 
Experiences of developed economies clearly show that as an economy grows there is a 
tendency for some small farmers to quit the sector and seek employment in other sectors, and 
there are others who accumulate enough capital to go big in the sector. This implies that 
there is a direct correlation between agricultural growth and the role of private investment in 
the sector. This in turn means that assuming the objective of accelerated agricultural 
development is achieved; it is likely that there will be a role change. The key actor in the 
sector's development will be relatively large-scale private investors and not the semi 
subsistence small farmers”  
“There are two investment areas that seem to be particularly suited for foreign investment in 
the agricultural sector. The first is to develop here-to-for unutilized vast land with high 
irrigation possibility. … The second investment opportunity is to produce high-value 
agricultural products (e.g. flowers, vegetables) where the scale of operation could be small or 
medium. The country's demand for participation in both areas is immense, and assurances 
are given that government institutions at all levels will do their level best to facilitate and 
assist foreign investor”. “While …. underlying the importance of encouraging domestic 
private investment through well-conceived incentives, the focus of attention should be on 
attracting foreign investors. Historically, efforts made to attract foreign investment are 
almost exclusively directed towards non-agricultural sectors. This needs to change if Ethiopia 
is to achieve its agricultural objectives” (MoFED, 2003, Rahmato, 2011). 
 
This was a clear indication of the government’s shift from small-holder farmer cultivation to 
capitalist farming and was followed by the legislative instruments issued in 2002 and 2003. 
Details of the legislation are not of any interest for our discussion, but the subsequent 
regulations issued by the Council of Ministers, which provided attractive financial incentives 
are noteworthy.  
• An income tax exemption for five years or more was given to those investment 
projects, domestic or foreign, engaged in agriculture and other sectors that exports 
more than 50 percent of its output, while those which export less were entitled to only 
two years exemption. 
• All capital goods imported by investors, construction materials and spare parts used 
for the establishment or upgrading of their enterprise were free of custom duty. 
Here, we can observe that investors that export their products were given strong 
encouragement than those which do not. This indicates that the main purpose of the shift to 
large-scale agriculture is foreign exchange earnings while it has less to do with domestic food 
security. 
Never the less, the government intensified promoting land, seeking foreign investors on large 
farm enterprises. In 2008 some promotional documents were posted on the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) website, but were removed shortly thereafter. I 
was told by an agricultural expert who is still active in Ethiopia that in the document of 2008, 
MoARD points out that out of the country’s 111,5 million hectares, 74 million hectares are 
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suitable for annual and perennial crop production. of these only 18 million hectares are 
currently under cultivation. In other words, according to the document, 56 million hectares are 
available for investment. The document was said to be very inviting to investors with capital 
and technology to exploit this opportunity. But since the disappearance of that document, 
senior MoARD officials have been giving significantly lower figures in public statements and 
press interviews. 
 
On the other hand, a biofuel strategy document released by the Ministry of Mines and Energy 
(MME) argues that the 24 million hectares of unutilized land suitable for growing bioethanol 
and biodiesel can be leased out without interfering with the production of food crops or 
jeopardizing the country’s plans for food security. Its main objective is, by using indigenous 
resources to facilitate adequate production of biofuels, to substitute imported petroleum and 
export excess products. According the document, the government’s plan is that the bioenergy 
production is to be undertaken by foreign and local investors with the government providing 
the land, financial incentives and other support (Anderson & Belay, 2008). A problem is that 
the method used for estimating available land for such purposes is unclear. An assessment 
made by Andersson and Belay reveals that, 
 
“In some regions, the amounts of land claimed to be available for biofuels development, were 
disproportionately large compared to the size of the regions. For instance, the stated 
available land for cultivation of biofuels crops in Gambela and Benshangul Gumuz were 
given as about 88% and 60% of the total size of the regions respectively. These bureaus are 
perhaps the same bodies that are responsible for allocation of land for investors. In such 
cases, there is the likelihood of allocating fertile lands or preserved forest areas for 
cultivation of energy crops” (Andersson & Belay, 2008).  
 
This is a clear indication that there is a good measure of guess work involved and that the 
authorities have not carried out a credible and accurate land suitability assessment.  
In 2008, the government designated MoARD to play a leading role in large-scale land deals 
with foreign and local investors, and with main responsibilities of preparing information and 
other technical inputs to attract investors, signing contracts and transferring lands, as well as 
undertaking follow up (Rahmato, 2011). All regions in Ethiopia are instructed to hand lands 
measuring 5000 hectares and over to a Federal land bank to be accessed by investors through 
MoARD.  But even though the deals are to be processed through MoARD, the income from 
the transactions (land rent, income tax-etc.) was to be utilized for the development of the 
regions concerned. With lands less than 5000 hectares, and excluding those lands submitted to 
the federal land bank, the regions are to continue to allocate as they did prior to the change of 
procedure. 
 
Prior to changing the procedure, the Regional Investment Commissions were in charge of 
processing and finalizing land deals after the environmental aspect of the investment projects 
had been approved by the regional counterpart of the federal Ethiopian Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA). EPA was in charge of reviewing the environmental impact 
assessment reports which always are to be prepared by the projects themselves, and making 
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decisions. According to the law, no project can start operation without approval given by 
EPA. EPA on its part had the responsibility of following up and supervising with the help of 
its subunits in the regions that contractual obligations were met with regard to environmental 
considerations. But since 2009, even though the technical and institutional capacity of 
MoARD to carry out the duties involved is questionable, the responsibility of EPA was 
transferred to MoARD (Rahmato, 2011). 
 
Table 2:   Land processed in six different regions of Ethiopia through the Federal Land Bank by the 
year 2010. 
 
Regions                       Land in Hectares
Amhara 420000
Afar 409678
Beni Shangul and Gumuz 691984
Gambella 829199
Oromia 1057866
SNNP 180625
Total 3589678
Source: Dessalegn Rahmato 2011, with main source MoARD 2009c, 2010a.  
 
The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) covering the period from 2010/11 – 2014/15, 
expects agriculture to grow at the rate of 14,9 percent annually and farm output to double by 
the year 2015. Even though smallholder farmers were mentioned in the plan, the main players 
were to be private investors in large scale farms for which the government will provide 
support and encouragement. 
 
“Fundamental policy directions that agriculture and rural development sector focuses on are 
scaling up productivity of labor and land; use different strategies for different agro ecological 
zones, focus on specialization and diversification and strengthening agricultural marketing 
system. On this basis Agricultural Development–led Industrialization Strategy focuses that 
small holder farmers/pastoralists need to efficiently use modern agricultural technologies and 
increase production and productivity. Moreover, the private sector is encouraged to increase 
its share of investment in agriculture” (MoFED 2010, Section 5.1.1). 
 
Looking at the emphasized statement above, we see that smallholders and pastoralists do not 
seem to be the government’s priority anymore; they are not seen to be important development 
partners. In the government’s budget for those five years, resources are not allocated to 
modernize smallholder farms. No indication is given with regard to the issue how 
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smallholders and pastoralists who can hardly make ends meet with food supply can be 
expected to acquire modern agricultural technologies.  
 
5.3.   Land allocation and transfers 
 
Even though, the allocation of farm land to investors has been going since the mid-1990s,  
up to 2002, those requesting land were predominantly local investors and the land granted was 
mostly small in size, not more than 500 hectares. The emergence of foreign investors is 
closely related to the enactment of the investment proclamation and the success of the 
floriculture business. Cut flowers business was booming between the years 2003 and 2007, 
with a growing market to Europe and elsewhere. Starting in 2006, the demand for land by 
foreign investors began to grow leading to the mad rush for land in 2008. The sizes of land 
requested were not small sizes anymore, with many applicants asking for large tracts 
measuring 10000 hectares, or more. By the end of 2008, around 35 percent of land allocated 
to investors by the regions was given out. According MoARD, during the period from 1996 to 
2008, the different regions have approved 8000 applications with the total land committed 
reaching over three million hectares.  By the end of 2009, there were around 500 foreign 
investors, either on their own or in joint ventures with local business. Karuturi, a company 
from Bangalore, India, is the largest foreign holding so far, given 300000 hectares of land in 
Gambella Region and 11000 hectares in Bako, Oromia. Foreign investors are given much 
bigger land in size, according government officials, with justification that they are better 
endowed in capital and technology and are more likely to be successful of their operations. If 
the GTP plan of 2010/11 – 2014/15 is to be successfully implemented, by the end of GTP 
period in 2015, the total land transferred to investors will reach nearly 7 million hectares, 
which is almost 40 percent of land currently cultivated by smallholders. 
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Table 3   Partial list of large-scale land transfers in Ethiopia 
      Foreign and Land Size   
Investor Domestic (Hectares)     Crops      Location 
          
Al Habesh Pakistan 28000 Sugar estate Wollega, Oromia 
Ambassel Domestic 10000 Biofuel crops Metekel, Beni Shangul 
Bazel Domestic 10000 Cotton, sesame Gambella 
B&D Food USA 18000 Sugar estate Awi, Amhara 
BHO Indian 27000 Rice, sesame Gambella 
Chadha Agro Indian 122000 Sugar, Biofuel Oromia 
Djibouti Gov't Djibouti 3000 Food crops Bale, Oromia 
Dubai World Dubai 5000 Tea Illubabor, Oromia 
E. Africa Agric Domestic 6500 Food crops Pawe, Beni Shangul 
Emami Biotech Indian 80000 Biofuel crops Oromia 
Finote Selaam Domestic 5000 Sesame Guba, Beni Shangul 
Flora EcoPower German 13000 Biofuel crops E.Hararge, Oromia 
Fri El Green Italy 30000 Biofuel crops Omo Valley, SNNP 
Global Energy Israel 10000 Biofuel  Wollaita, SNNP 
IDC Invest Danish 15000 Biofuel Assossa, Beni Shangul 
Kanan D Hills Indian 10000 Tea SNNP 
Karuturi Indian 300000 Rice, palm oil Gambella 
Karuturi Indian 11000 Rice, Biofuel Bako, Oromia 
P. Morrell USA 10000 Wheat Bale, Oromia 
N. Bank Egypt Egypt 20000 Food crops Afar 
Omo Sheleko Domestic 5500 Cotton, palm SNNP 
PetroPalm German 50000 Biofuel Bale, Oromia 
Ruchi Soya Indian 25000 Soya, palm oil Gambella 
Sannati Agro Indian 10000 Rice, pulses Gambella 
Saudi Star Saudi Arabia 139000 Rice, Soya Gambella 
Shamporji Indian 50000 Biofuel Beni Shangul  
Spentex Indian 25000 Cotton Beni Shangul 
Sun Biofuels UK 5000 Biofuel Wollaita, SNNP 
Sun Bio (NBC) UK 80000 Biofuel Metekel, Beni Shangul 
Sunrise Indust Indian 15000 Food crops Oromia 
Tomaisin Israel 10000 Food crops Oromia 
Vatic Indian 20000 Biofuel Borena, Oromia 
United Farm Bus Domestic 3000 Food crops Bako, Oromia 
Yehudi Hayun Israel 10000 Biofuel Oromia 
Source: Rahmato 2011      1133000 
  Note: Large-scale means over 2000 hectares 
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The type of land investments taking place in Ethiopia are two kinds. The first consist of those 
who are growing food or agro-industry crops, with the main food crops being, rice, maize, 
pulses and oil crops like sesame, while the preferred agro-industry crops are cotton and sugar 
cane. The second ones are more engaged in biofuel plants such as, castor oil trees, palm oil 
trees, and jatropha curcas. But there is no strict division between the two, as there are some 
engaged in both types of farming. Among the individual investors with multiple interests and 
varied investments, Sheikh Mohammed Al-Amoudi (Ethiopian born Saudi billionaire) is the 
largest, controlling extensive agricultural land in various regions through his group of 
companies established in Ethiopia. His investments include seven large ranches for raising 
livestock and processing dairy and poultry products, both for the home market and for export, 
a large tea estate, and extensive land possessions for growing food crops. Horizon-Ethiopia 
Investments (his latest established multi-purpose firm), is on process to receive 100000 
hectares of land in Gambella to grow palm oil and other biofuel crops. In addition to that, he 
has recently acquired 85000 hectares of land in Bench Majji Zone in SNNP for a rubber 
plantation project. 
The rental fee charged for agricultural land differs between regions and within regions as well. 
Charges are determined by; location, markets, access to transport, distance to banking 
services, and by possibilities of irrigation. Lands with the highest rental value are those 
located near urban centers with adequate roads and other basic services as well as benefitting 
from irrigation. The maximum rent charged is in the region of Oromia with 135 Birr per 
hectare and year.   
 
Table 4:   Land rental in selected regions, per hectare/year in Ethiopian Birr 
(USD 1 = 18-19 Ethiopian Birr)6 
Region          Rent Maximum            Rent Minimum     
   Amhara 79,37 14,21 
Beni 
Shangul 25 15 
Gambella 30 20 
Oromia 135 70 
SNNP 117 30 
Tigray 40 30 
Source: Rahmato 2011 
                       
6 USD 1 was around Birr 8,50 by the end of 1990s, and between 12,00-13,00 in 2004/2005. But after a 
devaluation which took place since then, at present, the Ethiopian Birr stands around 19,00 to USD 1. 
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These rental fees are extremely low by any standards. Because of the exceedingly low fee, 
investors were encouraged to request and acquire more land than they can actually manage, 
and as a result, a great deal of land has been left idle for years.  
As mentioned earlier, MoARD and the Regional Investment Commissions are in charge of 
signing contracts with investors. The contract documents do not demand heavy obligations 
from the investor side, but rather leaves them free without any interference to choose what 
crops to grow and where to market it. There is no condition on them to supply the local or 
national market.  Instead they are encouraged to export as much as possible of their products. 
Here we see that the food security needs of the country are ignored in this all exercise. The 
investors have no contractual obligations to invest in basic infrastructure, or to provide social 
services to the communities concerned. As has been witnessed in some cases, the government 
constructs roads and irrigations to be used by investors’ projects. One obligation on the 
investors which is found in almost all contracts is that all projects must plant native tree 
species which covers a minimum 2 percent of the project land. But during land clearance for 
the project, as vegetation and trees are destroyed, the benefits, if any, are very limited.  
Lack of consultation in decision making is common, which often leads to inter-agency 
contradictions. It is not unusual that the agency concerned is unaware of decisions made by 
others until informed of the need for its involvement, and that is after many measures have 
already been taken. MoARD is in charge of all the decision making on federal level, but only 
after consulting with key agencies, such as, the Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Authority 
(EWCA), which is in charge of managing the country’s national parks, game reserves and 
sanctuaries and few others. But to mention couple of examples out of many, EWCA appears 
to have been uninformed when the decision was made to transfer hundreds of thousands of 
hectares of land in the middle of Gambella national park, and when land was granted in the 
east of Oromia where Babile elephant sanctuary is located (Heckett & Aklilu, 2008). 
As mentioned earlier, the driving force behind the government’s policy were, among others, 
the belief that those investments will; 
• create employment opportunities in the localities concerned. 
• produce export crops which will increase the country’s foreign earnings, and also 
expected to expand cotton and sugar cane production needed for agro-industry. 
• provide the opportunity for technology transfer. 
• build the infrastructure and social assets such as health posts, schools, access to 
clean water which all benefits the local communities. 
• promote energy security. 
Ten years has passed since “land grabbing” began. So far, there is little evidence that any of 
these objectives have been met, while the damage done as a result of the projects presence is 
piling up.  
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We took Ethiopia as a case study in order to provide an overall picture of the agricultural 
situation in Sub-Saharan Africa since the start of the “land grabbing”, and now we will take a 
look at two communities in different regions in Ethiopia with the aim to provide a broader 
picture of the hardships most rural communities in the country appears to be going through. 
The field surveys in the two communities are done with personal presence of Rahmato, which 
he wrote his findings in his article “Land to Investors- Large-Scale Land Transfers in 
Ethiopia”, in 2011. 
5.4.   Impacts of large-scale land investments on Gambella Region 
Gambella is located in the west of the country bordering and sharing many ecological features 
with Southern Sudan. The region is rich in biodiversity and wildlife and the land cover 
consists of high forest, varieties of woodland, shrub-land, savanna grassland and permanent 
and seasonal wetlands with the largest permanent wetland located there. Among the four main 
rivers in the region, the river Alwero which has a dam built over it, provides irrigation water 
to the second largest investor in the region, The Saudi Star. The dam was built by the previous 
military regime in Ethiopia and not by the investor. The rivers are vital for the inhabitants of 
the region, as they use them for fishing, which is a useful means of income and for home 
consumption.  
The diverse wildlife is the most important treasure of Gambella with around twenty wild 
animal species of which some are of international significance. The seasonal wildlife 
migration that takes place between Gambella and South Sudan is considered by experts as the 
second largest wildlife migration in Africa (Purdie, 2010). 
Gambella is inhabited by three major ethnic groups, the Nuer (population 113000), the 
Annuak (100000), and the Majangir (60000). For all three groups, communal ownership is the 
customary system of property relations. Mainly for this reason, registration and land 
certification was not undertaken in Gambella as is the case in major pastoralist regions of 
Ethiopia, Afar and Somali as well. All these major ethnic groups of Gambella are now 
affected by the investment projects as the land, the natural resources and the ecosystem in 
place which are vital for their livelihood are now affected by the projects. These projects are 
seen as a threat by the majority of the population in the region (Rahmato, 2011).  
The Annuaks, with dispersed settlements are dependent on the cultivation of the land and crop 
production, supplementing their income by fishing from the river, hunting (source for meat), 
honey production, and access of resources from the forests, grasslands and woodlands. As 
what is produced by way of cultivation is not enough for the needs of families for the whole 
year, the Annuaks are dependent on wild food sources from the woods and forests in order to 
withstand the hardship season. The Nuers are pastoralists and the rivers are vital for the 
survival of their livestock. Their yearly routine is moving from the banks of the rivers to the 
uplands and vice versa depending on the seasons. The area where the third major ethnic group 
the Majangir lives is the most densely forested in the region. The Majangir mainly depend on 
forest resources for their survival. They are known as honey producers for which the forest 
ecosystem is critical (Rahmato, 2011).  
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Against this background, what do facts on the ground tell us about the effects of those large 
land transfers to investors in Gambella? Some projects are inside the National Park and 
protected areas and some others are in areas where they block or interfere with transit 
corridors which seriously affect the migration routes of the animals. Moreover, there are many 
projects in locations that block the animals from access to seasonal pastures or water points. 
Regarding the effects of the projects on the human population, in addition to depriving them 
of vital resources from what until now has been their common property, evictions in the form 
of mass resettlement is becoming a common practice. As witnessed by Rahmato’s field work, 
loss of the woods, grass and other vegetation in the process of clearing the land by investment 
projects, is causing hardship to the local communities (Rahmato, 2011). 
Rahmato and his team made their field work among the Annuak population in two villages in 
Abobo wereda (district), a district affected by the establishment of Saudi Star investment 
project which was given users right of Alwero river with its dam built by the previous military 
government. The circa 120 households covered in Rahmato’s field work were forced to move 
from the land of their ancestors under the resettlement program. This came as a complete 
surprise to the villagers. They all informed the field team that they had not been consulted and 
that they had no knowledge of it. The objectives of the resettlement given by the authorities to 
justify their action is that public agents will have better access to provide essential services 
such as education, health and clean water. But the villagers were not convinced and were 
dissatisfied, as they believe that services could be provided without any problem at their 
location and that there was no need for relocation. The resettlement program is called by the 
villagers “the clearance program” as they are convinced that the whole exercise is to clear land 
for the investment projects in place and for those planned in the future.  
Almost all Annuaks interviewed by Rahmato’s team believe that the land given to investors 
without their knowledge and without compensation belongs to their community and is 
common property. They stated that they had been informed by wereda (district) officials about 
the land transfers. The wereda officials themselves, when interviewed by Rahmato and the 
team, stated that they had not been consulted on the matter but had been instructed by higher 
authorities to convey the decision to the people concerned. One official, who used to support 
the investment projects and was, now against, told the field team of his disappointment of 
higher officials and project managers. None of the many promises to develop the communities 
had been kept.  
The social and economic hardships caused by the clearing of the land and large-scale 
deforestation by Saudi Star start to be felt by the villagers, as the plentiful wildlife which they 
occasionally used to hunt for consumption, has now disappeared. Even the local officials 
interviewed can hardly see any benefit to the residents of the two villages, as what is produced 
by the projects is totally destined for export while nothing is left for the local market. In a 
region which is not self-sufficient in food and where food shortages are common for several 
months over the year, the villagers, especially women, are worried of the disturbance on their 
natural resources caused by the presence of Saudi Star. All respondents interviewed by the 
survey team confirmed that the project has not provided any services or invested in any assets 
of benefit to the community (Rahmato, 2011). 
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Regarding employment, even though almost all the unskilled manual and seasonal jobs were 
taken by local people, there is no job security or any training program for upgrading, and 
wages are low, between 17 to 23 Birr (USD 1:00) per day. A senior manager of Saudi Star in 
Addis Ababa confirmed to the team that on average, the project employs 250 workers, of 
which around 60 are permanent skilled employees and the rest are daily laborers from the 
villages under the survey.  
Another case which is noteworthy is the experience of Godere wereda (district) where the 
major inhabitants are from the Majangir ethnic group. This wereda shares border with the 
neighboring SNNP Region and as a result the same ethnic groups are found on both sides of 
the border. Many in this wereda are dependent on the forest for their livelihoods with honey 
production being the most important economic activity. There is a unique form of rights to 
trees here where bee hives are hang and respected by everyone. In other words, individuals 
hold rights over the trees where their hives are placed, and the forest is a common property of 
the community. 
In the past, the people of Godere wereda have seen the hardships experienced by the local 
inhabitants in their neighbor community in SNNP Region, when investors cleared their forest 
for planting tea. Terrified by their neighbor’s negative experience, the whole population of 
Godere reacted aggressively, when they heard that 5000 hectares of prime forest land had 
been granted to an Indian Company named Lucky Exports for tea plantation. As they have 
seen it already, they were aware that their traditional way of life is to be destroyed. They got 
organized and held a series of meetings which resulted in an alternative land use plan that they 
presented to the Federal government. The plan involved the transfer of the land given to the 
investor back to the community to use it to grow agricultural products without disturbing the 
forest or damaging the ecosystem. The investor left the area and the forest has been saved for 
the time being, even though the local authorities have detained few activists suspected of 
being protest leaders. 
5.5.   The case of Bako Tibee District in Oromia Region    
Bako Tibee is a wereda (district) within Oromia Region located about 250 kms west of Addis 
Ababa. The inhabitants are predominantly Oromo7 and are smallholder farmers dependent on 
family plots and the surrounding resources. The wereda has a total population of 125000 
inhabitants spread over 28 kebeles (sub-districts) and its land cover includes arable land, open 
wood land, grazing land, forest and shrub land. In their major economic activity which is 
smallholder farming, the main crops grown are wheat, sorghum, maize, teff, oil seeds and 
spices. In addition, livestock rising is an important income source and there is a large 
livestock population.  
The same Indian firm operating in Gambella, Karuturi is the largest investor here. Karuturi, 
having already an enormous estate in Gambella, was in 2009 granted 11000 hectares in Bako 
with plans to grow palm oil trees, rice and maize, predominantly for export. The company has 
                       
7 The largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, representing around 35 percent of the total population. 
 
 
 
  
40 
 
been allowed to use the Aboko River, which the local farmers used to depend on to grow 
sugar cane and vegetables along its banks. But since the emergence of the project, the river, 
other streams and natural springs have become unavailable to them (Rahmato, 2011).  
Looking at the background of the land transferred in Bako area, it used to be owned by local 
gentry, but after the land reforms of the previous military regime, it was considered common 
property. Even in the past, when it was under the ownership of the gentry, it was used by the 
community and the households for grazing and more. According to the farmers interviewed, 
the smallholder farmers used this area to grow a variety of food crops until the land was 
transferred to Karuturi. Moreover, the area provided access to firewood, to useful plants and 
water sources for both humans and livestock. There was a strong sense of community rights to 
the land among all the smallholders interviewed and the land was by no means “unused” as 
the regional authorities claimed. There was no compensation paid to the farmers affected 
when the land was taken by the investor. The smallholders who had farming plots on the land 
were denied certification of their plots during the land certification program of 2008. The over 
500 smallholders who lost their plots when the land was transferred to Karuturi, strongly 
believes that they should be entitled to have their plots registered, as they have been farming it 
for years with the approval of the local authorities (Rahmato, 2011).  
No significant infrastructural or social investments are done by the company, except widening 
an old dirt road leading from the main road to the project site, and in which many farmers lost 
their fruit trees and land in the process of this extension. As a result of this extension, around 
150 smallholders’ lost property, including registered plots, for which they never got 
compensated.  
The project has provided some employment to the local people, but with no job security and 
daily wage of 12 Birr (USD 0.67) to its casual work force. This wage is very low by any 
standard, just 2/3 of what the smallholders working in the Productive Safety Net Program 
(PSNP) are earning. There are 30 permanent employees and around 60 regular non-skilled 
laborers. On average, there are around 200 casual workers reaching around 600 in the peak 
season. The project uses a rotational employment method in times of high demand changing 
laborers each week which further depresses their earning possibility. As mentioned earlier, 
there is no employment security nor any means of wage upgrading based on experience gained 
or/and longer service. 
Those two villages considered in this paper are among hundreds of villages going through 
similar experience. Finally, I would like to put a copy of an article exposing the suffering of 
the smallholders in another village in the Sothern Region of Ethiopia called Lower Omo 
Valley. 
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Critical Discussion 
It is widely accepted that agricultural growth is the primary source of poverty reduction in 
most agriculture-based economies, and is the case in SSA. GDP growth originating in 
agriculture is five times more effective in reducing poverty in low income countries than 
growth in other sectors. In SSA, it is 11 times more effective (FAO 2012). The controversy 
lies on the type of agricultural policy chosen. As we saw in the case of Ethiopia, during the 
last decade the government started twisting its traditional smallholder friendly rural 
development policies in favor of large-scale agricultural investments. This was confirmed on 
its modified Rural Development Policy and Strategies of 2001 (see page 30 on this paper). 
From the document, one can find contradicting arguments by the government, where it says 
first,  
 
“Experiences of developed economies clearly show that as an economy grows there is a 
tendency for some small farmers to quit the sector and seek employment in other sectors, and 
there are others who accumulate enough capital to go big in the sector” (Page 30).  
 
This statement indicates that in the development process the whole dynamic is taking place 
within the smallholders and is in line with my argument. But then in the same document we 
find, 
  
“The focus of attention should be on attracting foreign investors. Historically, efforts made to 
attract foreign investment are almost exclusively directed towards non-agricultural sectors. 
This needs to change if Ethiopia is to achieve its agricultural objectives” (Page 30). 
 
This is the policy currently exercised in Ethiopia and most SSA and which I found it contrary 
to the first argument. If large-scale foreign investors are to be favored at the expense of 
smallholders, how is an inclusive and dynamic development to take place? When we talk of 
poverty and rural development in SSA, is it not smallholders what it is all about? 
 
Small farms have a crucial place in the rural economy but their potential power to drive 
economic growth has not always been recognized. Research by FAO suggests that, on 
average, small farms in developing countries generate 40-60 per cent of total rural income, 
including both farm and non-farm activities (FAO, 2010). Although some donors and 
government decision-makers still hold the view that more large-scale plantations are needed 
to ‘modernize’ agriculture, there is considerable evidence that smallholder farmers can not 
only be more productive but also reduce poverty more than large farms (FAO, 2011).  
 
• In Uganda, smallholders working an average plot of 1.7 acres produce 96 per cent of 
the food that passes through the market outlets in the country (McKinney, 2009). 
• In Ghana and Zambia, smallholders produce 80 per cent of the food (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2008). 
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• In Brazil, smallholders hold only a quarter of the land but produce 87 per cent of the 
cassava, 70 per cent of the beans and 50 per cent of the poultry (Via Campesina, 
2010). 
 
As recently noted by the FAO, smallholders can have significant advantages over large-scale 
farmers in terms of efficiency in producing staple foods. The FAO notes that ‘there is a rich 
empirical literature suggesting that output per unit area in small farms is higher compared 
with larger farms’. This is due to greater intensity in the use of inputs, especially of family 
labor, which increases food security. Such family labor offers flexibility denied to larger farms 
that depend on wage labor. The FAO also highlights that smallholder production is more 
suitable for labor-intensive produce, such as vegetables, that require transplanting, multiple 
harvests by hand and for other produce that requires attention to detail (FAO 2012).  
 
Small farms also play major social roles. Income from small farms tends to be spent on local 
goods and services, boosting local economies. As Hazel put it, small farms are more likely to 
employ people than adopt capital-intensive technologies, which are critical in economies with 
a labor surplus (Hazel, et al., 2007).  
 
It is worth recalling that the two countries that have reduced rural poverty the most in recent 
decades – China and Vietnam – did so by empowering smallholder farmers with tiny plots of 
land. In China, rural poverty was reduced among 200 million smallholders with an average 
holding of just 0.65 hectares, and in Vietnam, the average landholding was around 0.46 ha 
(FAO, 2006). 
 
As the above examples indicate, the way to eradicate poverty in SSA is to include and 
empower the smallholders in the massive agricultural investment needed in the sector. One 
might ask, despite the domination of smallholder farming in SSA in the past, and particularly 
in Ethiopia, why no significant development took place? This is a valid question which needs 
to be addressed.  
 
If we take Ethiopia, as it is the case study, for centuries up to 1974, the country was under 
feudal system, which was very extractive where the few rural and urban elites exploited the 
great majority of peasants. Following the 1974/75 revolution and land reform, which put all 
land under the state ownership, the Marxist oriented military regime introduced a marketing 
board for agricultural products in which all smallholders were ordered to sell their surplus 
product to the marketing board owned by the state for prices decided by the board. During this 
period, the smallholders were exploited by the state with no incentive left for them to develop. 
The result of that period, as we all know, was the 1984/85 hunger catastrophes. And now 
under the present regime, except for the first five years (1991-1995), the government is 
advocating for large-scale agricultural investments.  
 
As the brief background of Ethiopian agricultural history shows, the smallholders were never 
given the opportunity to reach their potential. Whatever surplus they produced was extracted 
by the feudal lords or the state. For most SSA, agriculture is at subsistence level and the 
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majority of the smallholders are using backward agricultural practices (traditional 
technologies) for cultivation, harvesting and storage. To drag the region’s poor agricultural 
production and productivity out of backwardness, capital and investment flow have crucial 
importance. However, large scale agriculture investment can be useful as long as the interest 
of smallholders is seriously considered and their potential identified. 
 
Conclusion 
In recent decades, agricultural GDP growth in SSA has been relatively strong reaching the 
highest in 2009 among the developing regions, and kept pace with population growth. 
However, the growth is not as a result of increases in land productivity but mainly through 
expansion of the cultivated area onto the region’s relatively abundant land (Livingstone, et al., 
2011). This expansion strategy in a way reflects the relative availability and lower costs of 
land relative to capital inputs required for intensification, such as fertilizer, credit and 
irrigation etc. While “land grabbers” will likely account for some of the agricultural growth, 
the significant portion is still the result of smallholder farming. 
 
The central to the agricultural economies of most SSA countries has been and still is the 
family farm which has proved to be productive and responsive to new markets and 
opportunities. However, as I mentioned in the introduction, there are those who see 
smallholders as an obstacle to development. But before coming to such conclusion, one has to 
make sure that the smallholder’s production capacity reached its optimal. As far as SSA is 
concerned, that is not the case. In most if not all SSA countries, there is a huge gap between 
the actual and potential production of smallholder farming waiting to be exploited. Investment 
on fertilizers and small-scale irrigations for instance, along with identifying the right seeds 
would make a drastic change on the output of smallholder farming. Moreover, building the 
technical capacity of smallholders can increase their yields and reduce their vulnerability to 
shocks, while improving and stabilizing market access for smallholders also increases their 
potential revenues and gives them more commercial predictability and makes smallholders a 
safer bet for financial institutions in the future. But today, the poor majority are exposed for 
dispossession from a major ”land grab”, because a high proportion of land which they use is 
not registered, and the customary land management in which they traditionally relay on is 
under pressure. The challenge now facing most SSA countries is how best to secure family 
land rights, in order to enable smallholders to address global competition more effectively. 
Welcoming foreign and/or domestic investors into the agricultural sector of SSA is not wrong, 
as there is plenty of excess land which is currently of not interest to the smallholders and 
pastoralists. In most SSA, at least on paper, the land leasing program is designed with proper 
consideration taken to pastoralists and especially to the smallholders. For instance in Ethiopia, 
the Federal Government assigned the Regional Governments to locate and register all the 
excess land in their regions on ongoing basis which haven’t been in use for years or centuries 
and not in use now due to lack of mainly infrastructure. Once they are reported, they are 
registered under the Federal Land Bank which is established for this purpose. Following this 
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procedure, the Federal government promoted these lands to investors and many foreign and 
domestic investors responded positively. The implications started during the implementation 
process. As the Federal Government did not provide the financial and human resources 
required for careful implementation, federal and regional government officials are given a free 
hand to process the handover of land to investors. As investors are by nature mostly interested 
in maximizing profit by minimizing cost, they started corrupting regional and federal 
officials8 to get land which is currently occupied by smallholders, and which did not require 
any significant infrastructural investment.  
Going back to the three researches mentioned at the beginning of this paper and from which 
this study brought a great deal of material, they (Kachika, 2010; Cotula, et al.,2009; and 
Rahmato, 2011), all described well the hardships faced by the marginalized groups in selected 
SSA countries, as a result of the recent “land grabbing”. But none of them came with a 
possible alternative.  
One thing which everyone agrees on is that SSA’s agricultural sector needs to be transformed 
and for this to happen, massive input of capital is crucial. Private investors both foreign and 
domestic are best positioned to play a big role and fill this gap, but they need to be guided and 
watched closely by government agencies so that the interest of smallholders and pastoralists is 
protected. So far, as the findings of this and other studies reveal, despite the clear guidelines 
of CAADP and CF&G (both endorsed by SSA countries Heads of States) to all Sub-Saharan 
governments, the already much marginalized groups are totally neglected and victimized in 
the process. 
The common argument given by Sub-Saharan governments for supporting the ongoing “land 
grabbing” is that the belief on incoming investors may bring capital, technology, know-how, 
market access and may play an important role in the economic development of the rural areas. 
But as many previous researches including this one reveals, none of those expectations are 
met so far and some of the possible reasons are,  
• Foreign investors are covering (which they are allowed by investment law) 70 percent 
of their operational costs from local sources, while their export earnings are repatriated 
fully to their home accounts, and under such circumstance, it is difficult to see how the 
government can gain the much needed hard currency.  
• The disproportionate favor given to foreign investors is counter-productive as it is 
becoming an obstacle for strong local entrepreneurial class to grow.  
• The investors have no obligation to contribute to the food security needs of the 
country, as the contracts signed do not contain provisions requiring projects to supply 
the local market under any conditions including emergency circumstances.  
                       
8 This statement cannot be supported with hard evidence at this stage. But just by looking at the situation of the 
smallholders in Ethiopia, in areas where the “land grabbing” is taking place, and the rates paid per hectare for the 
transfers, it is entirely believed by almost all Ethiopians that corruption involving huge amount of money is 
taking place. Some regional governors are charged and jailed in connection with land transfers and more will 
probably follow in the future. 
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• As projects are operated with high technology which is not transferable or affordable 
to smallholders, there is no technology transfer taking place at the moment. Large-
scale farming is operated and managed in a very different way from that of family 
farms and under the present policy environment, there is no meeting ground for the 
two.  
Land dealings are not new in SSA. Even though they may not involve cash payments, some 
forms of land transaction have a long history, such as rental and sharecropping agreements, 
mortgage of land, temporary rights giving access for a season’s cropping, and sale of full 
ownership rights have all been practiced in most parts of SSA (Lavigne Delville, 2002). But 
as changing values bring a transformation in the authority claimed by different structures, 
whether family heads, customary chiefs or local government, the rapid pace of change which 
we are witnessing in SSA today is bringing new risks to formerly stable systems of property 
rights. The root cause of this uncertainty in many areas is the existence of high proportion of 
land for which no written paper exists, to document the rights held, or the terms on which 
these rights can be exercised. What is needed is that customary land rights with few 
adjustments need to be fully recognized and that genuine investment in and support to local 
food production is the only real basis of broad-based rural development. In other words, 
stricter regulation and monitoring, as well as increased transparency of land deals is needed. 
Governments in SSA have to secure land and property rights to the smallholders prior to 
allocating any land to investors on the area in question. Such practice is a guarantee that the 
lands given to investors are unused. 
Moreover, governments should give a serious attention to the recommendations given on 
CAADP and CF&G, and stick to its principles. To mention the ones which are appropriate on 
the issue; 
• Comprehensive land policies are needed so that the hardships experienced and the 
risks currently faced by pastoralists, women, and smallholder farmers in Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, and Tanzania … etc., does not become the norm in other land deals in 
SSA. 
• When defining the rights of agricultural investors, governments should guarantee 
access to local communities to vital and scarce land related resources like grazing land 
and water, to avoid the ongoing experiences of among others, Tanzania, Mali, 
Mozambique, and Ethiopia. 
• In every agricultural investment deals, specific interest groups should be represented, 
particularly, smallholder farmers, pastoralists, and women. 
 
Finally, even though we find a lot similarity on the nature of “land grabbing” in SSA, one 
should be reserved from generalizing the problem as uniform and coming with “one fits all” 
solution. Let alone the whole SSA, even within each of every single country, land deals take 
many different forms and proceed in a wide diversity of contexts. For instance, transactions 
labeled as “large-scale” may involve 1,000 hectares or 500,000 hectares, and solution 
recommendations need to be tailored to their contexts. Africa’s abundant, uncultivated arable 
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land provides space for expansion, but it has its limits and the ratio of the cost of land to 
capital inputs faced by farmers is constantly increasing. The main challenge now for 
smallholders is how to move from expansion towards greater intensification, and as far as the 
“land grabbers” (investors) are concerned; the social disturbances that they are causing will 
soon or later make their investments unsustainable. This is then a good opportunity for both, 
investors and smallholders (as the nature of the problems they are or will be facing requires 
each other’s association), to build a partnership for mutual benefit. To come up with or to 
recommend a specific form of partnership is not an easy task and is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but some sort of contract farming based on free market principles might be ideal for 
both parties. 
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Appendix 1 
THE COMPREHENSIVE AFRICA AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 
(CAADP) 
Acting on strong interest among AU countries to put agriculture at the forefront of the 
development agenda in Africa, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
secretariat in 2002 began consulting with the U.N., Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
to develop a continent-wide strategy for agricultural growth, entitled the Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). After consultations with the African 
Ministers of Agriculture, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), African Development 
Bank and sub-regional banks, World Bank, and United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa, an initial strategy for CAADP was developed, based on four pillars for investment in 
agricultural development (Ouswmane Badiane 2009). 
 
4.3.   CAADP’s Four Pillars 
The original objectives of CAADP’s four technical pillars are described below. 
 
1. Extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control 
systems, and the objectives are to: 
a) revert fertility loss and resource degradation, and ensure broad-based and rapid adoption of 
sustainable land and forestry management practices in the smallholder as well as commercial 
sectors; and  
b) improve management of water resources while expanding access to both small- and large-
scale irrigation. 
 
2. Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access, and 
the objective is to  
a) accelerate growth in the agricultural sector by raising the capacities of private 
entrepreneurs, including commercial and small-holder farmers, to meet the increasingly 
complex quality and logistical requirements of markets (domestic, regional and international) 
focusing on selected agricultural commodities that offer the potential to raise rural (on- and 
off farm) incomes; and  
b) create the required regulatory and policy framework that would facilitate the emergence of 
regional economic spaces that would spur the expansion of regional trade and cross-country 
investments.  
 
3. Increasing food supply and reducing hunger, and the objective is to  
a) establish at the national level, well-managed and regionally coordinated food reserves and 
early warning systems that would allow African countries to respond in a timely and cost-
effective manner to food emergency crises;  
b) reduce malnutrition in school-going children, through diet supplementation with a complete 
meal that is adequate in carbohydrates, fat, protein, vitamins and minerals, and to expand local 
demand and stimulate production by smallholder farmers;  
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c) develop an African Nutrition Initiative to meet countries’ broader nutritional challenges in a 
way that takes account of the complex and multispectral nature of the problem and possible 
solutions. 
 
4. Expand agricultural research, and technology dissemination and adoption, and the 
objective is to  
a) achieve a sustained flow of technologies suitable to the African context and adequately 
meet the challenges of African agriculture through national agricultural technology systems 
that are responsive to constraints and opportunities facing farmers;  
b) mobilize the large potential of cassava to contribute to food security and income generation 
among African countries;  
c) contribute to food security and poverty reduction, and ensure sustainable resource 
management, in the rice sector of ten Eastern, Central and Southern African countries through 
broad-based access to high-yielding New Rice for Africa (NERICA) rice lines, other 
improved varieties, and accompanying technologies; and  
d) safeguard the future contribution of Africa’s fish sector to poverty alleviation and regional 
economic development, in particular through  
• improved management of natural fish stocks;  
• development of aquaculture production; and  
• expansion of fish marketing and trade. 
 
4.4.   CAADP: From strategy to implementation 
In June 2002, the African Ministers of Agriculture reviewed and endorsed NEPAD’s strategy 
for CAADP at a meeting in Rome. The strategy was launched formally by the African Union 
(AU) Heads of State about a year later in Maputo. Subsequent consultation with RECs and 
NEPAD member countries on the implementation of the strategy brought some fundamental 
changes. The initial strategy offered an already-defined, detailed set of CAADP project 
activities which did not lend themselves easily to decentralized, bottom up implementation. 
REC and country leaders ended up deciding for a decentralized approach that would allow 
them to identify and tailor country CAADP activities to their own needs and circumstances, 
thus improving CAADP’s chances of success at the local level. Responding to this input, the 
NEPAD secretariat decided in 2004 to pursue a new, internally formulated “roadmap”1 for 
CAADP implementation. The roadmap empowered the RECs and countries to lead the 
CAADP process, but retained the four CAADP technical pillars and objectives defined in the 
earlier strategy (Ousmane Badiane 2009). 
